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Multi-sided platforms coordinate the demands of distinct groups of
customers who need each other in some way. Dating clubs, for example,
enable men and women to meet each other; magazines provide a way for
advertisers to find an audience, and computer operating system vendors
provide software that applications users and applications developers can
use together. When devising pricing and investment strategies, multi-sided
platforms must account for interactions among the demands of multiple
groups of customers. In theory, the optimal price to customers on one side
of the platform is not based on a markup formula such as the Lerner
condition, and price does not track marginal cost. Indeed, many actual
platform businesses charge one side little or nothing-shopping malls
seldom charge shoppers; operating system vendors give developers many
services for free; most Internet portals and free television providers do not
charge viewers. Competition among platforms takes place in multi-sided
markets in which seemingly distinct customer groups are connected
through interdependent demand and a platform that, acting as an
intermediary, internalizes the resulting indirect network externalities.
Multi-sided platforms arise in many economically significant industries
from media to payment systems and software; they arise in bricks and
mortar industries such as shopping malls as well as information-based
industries such as portals.
The economics of platform competition has implications for analyzing
antitrust and regulatory policies affecting businesses that compete in
multi-sided markets. For example, market definition and market power
analyses that focus on a single side will lead to analytical errors; since
pricing and production decisions are based on coordinating demand
among interdependent customer groups, one must consider the multiple
market sides in analyzing competitive effects and strategies. To take
another example, efficient pricing may result in setting price on a
particular market side below measures of average variable or marginal
cost incurred for customers on that market side. Economic analysis that
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ignores the multi-sided nature of the market might conclude erroneously
that below-cost prices are predatory. Line-of-business restrictions in
regulation as well as theories of market leveraging in antitrust are other
areas that are illuminated by the economics of multi-sided platform
markets. Line-of-business restrictions may hinder the emergence of a
platform and deprive consumers of its benefits. Efforts to coordinate
interdependent markets-and thereby produce potential efficiency gains in
multi-sided markets-must be distinguished from efforts to extend a
monopoly from one product to another. Businesses may devise anti-
competitive strategies in multi-sided platform markets just as in single-
sided markets. Multi-sided strategies for doing so, though, are likely to be
more complex and less transparent than those used in single-sided
markets. There is, however, no basis for asking regulators or antitrust
enforcers to steer clear of these industries or to spend extra effort on them.
An understanding of the unique economic principles that govern pricing
and investment in multi-sided markets will lead to discerning and efficient
regulation of this important type of business.
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Introduction
Dating clubs-typically bars or cafes-are an innovative way for men
and women to meet each other in Japan.' At one club, for example, men
and women sit on opposite sides of a glass divide. If a man sees a woman
he likes, he can ask a waiter to carry a "love note" to her.2 Dating clubs
sell patrons the prospect of making a match.' Their business works only if
they attract enough members of the opposite sex to their club to make a
match likely. Enough men must participate to attract women, and enough
women to attract men. The club must figure out how much to charge men
and women to get the right number and mix of patrons, while at the same
time make money. One bar does this by charging men $100 for
membership plus $20 a visit, and letting female members in free of
charge . An unscientific survey shows that a pricing structure that obtains
a disproportionate share of the revenues from men is common in singles
bars, discotheques, and other businesses around the world that help men
and women find companionship.'
I Howard W. French, Osaka Journal: Japanese Date Clubs Take the Muss Out of Mating,




5 Here are some examples based on recent (web site) visits: C2K, a dance club in Las
Vegas, is free for local women while the cover charge is $10 for out-of-state women and $15 for men,
Las Vegas Nightlife, BEST READ GUIDE, at http://www.bestreadguide.com/lasvegas/nightlife/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2003); the Buddha Lounge in Chicago charges $5-415 less to women, depending on the
day of the week, than to men, Buddha Lounge, CENTERSTAGE CHICAGO, at
http://centerstage.net/dance/clubs/buddha-lounge.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2002); and on Saturday
nights, The Wave Nightclub in Atlantic City lets women in for free while men are assessed a cover
charge of $10, Pamela Mills-Senn, Atlantic City Nightlife, POOL NEWS & SPA ONLINE, Jan. 2002, at
http://www.poolspanews.com/2002/01 I/acnightlife.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). A recently
developed online matching service that specializes in matching identical twins has chosen equal prices.
Twins Seek Twins in Online Matchmaking First, REUTERS, Apr. 11,2002; Twins Realm Home Page,
at http://www.twinsrealm.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). Yahoo! Personals is another example of a
dating service that has symmetric prices. There is no charge to view or post personal ads, and men and
women pay the same fee for contacting each other through the service. Yahoo! Personals, Why
Subscribe to Yahoo! Personals?, at http://personals.yahoo.com/display?cthft=billingsplash (last
visited Mar. 8, 2003).
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Matchmaking is an example of a product that must be used by two or
more groups of customers to be valuable to any single customer.
Businesses that sell these products need customers of type A to get
customers of type B and vice versa. To get both sides on board, businesses
operate a "platform" that connects or coordinates the activities of multiple
groups of customers. The dating club, for example, aggregates men and
women and provides a place for them to meet and transact a date. Many
economically significant industries are based on platform businesses that
serve multiple disparate communities. Examples include shopping malls
(retailers and shoppers), video game consoles (game developers and
users), debit cards (cardholders and merchants), operating system software
(applications developers, hardware manufacturers, and users), media
(advertisers and viewers), and exchanges (buyers and sellers).
Platform businesses compete in "multi-sided markets." For example,
video game console companies such as Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft
compete for game developers and users, while payment card companies
such as American Express, MasterCard, and Visa compete for merchants
and cardholders. Platform businesses must deal with interdependent
demand when devising pricing, production, and investment strategies.
These strategies can be quite different from non-platform businesses that
do not serve mutually dependent customer groups. The optimal price on a
particular side of the market, whether measured socially or privately, does
not follow marginal cost on that side of the market. Many platform
businesses charge one side little or nothing; for example, most operating
system vendors collect scant revenue from software developers who use
their intellectual property. In many cases, the joint provision of a good that
services multiple groups of customers makes the assignment of costs to
any one side arbitrary; for example, there is no economically meaningful
allocation of the costs of developing or manufacturing video game
consoles to individual game developers or users.
The economics of platform competition has implications for antitrust
and regulatory policies in multi-sided markets. Predatory pricing is an
obvious example. Efficient pricing may result in setting price on a
particular market side below measures of average variable or marginal cost
incurred for customers on that market side. Economic analysis that ignores
the multi-sided nature of the market might conclude erroneously that this
is an example of simultaneous recoupment-low prices on one side are
being used to obtain or maintain market power on another side.
Market definition and market power analyses are another example.
These analyses typically focus on the effect of a price change on demand
in a narrowly defined market. For firms that compete in multi-sided
markets, a price change on one side of the market has positive feedback
effects on the other sides of the market; the analyst must consider these
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crossover effects to determine the overall effect of a price change on
profits.
Line-of-business restrictions in regulation as well as theories of
market leveraging in antitrust are other areas that the economics of multi-
sided platform markets illuminates. Line-of-business restrictions may
hinder the emergence of a platform and deprive consumers of its benefits.
Efforts to coordinate interdependent markets-and thereby produce
potential efficiency gains in multi-sided markets-need to be distinguished
from efforts to extend a monopoly from one product to another. Businesses
may devise anti-competitive strategies in multi-sided platform markets just
as they may do in single-sided markets. Multi-sided strategies for doing so
are likely to be more complex and less transparent than those used in
single-sided markets. The fact that pro-competitive practices will be no
less complex makes antitrust analysis difficult.
U.S. and foreign antitrust enforcement agencies have scrutinized
multi-sided platform businesses in several significant antitrust matters.
These include the AOL-Time Warner merger (U.S. and European
authorities investigated two-sided markets such as Internet portals,
magazines, and free television);6 the credit card association investigations
(Australian and European authorities investigated a two-sided market
involving merchants and card users);7 U.S., European, and private antitrust
cases against Intel (which competes in a two-sided hardware platform
market); 8 the Microsoft cases (U.S. and European authorities investigated
multi-sided markets involving operating systems and other possible
computer platforms);9 the proposed merger of HotJobs and Monster.corn
(FTC investigated a two-sided market of online job services);'0 and probes
6 See In re America Online, Inc. & Time Warner Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3989 (Dec. 14,
2000) (complaint), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolcomplaint.pdf Other relevant documents may be
found at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3989.htm (last visited July 25, 2002).
7 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Plans to Clear Certain Visa
Provisions, Challenge Others (Oct. 16, 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/
cases/29373/studies/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); Press Release, Reserve Bank of Australia, Designation
of Credit Card Schemes in Australia (Apr. 12, 2001), http://www.rba gov.au!
MediaReleases/2001/mr01 09.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
8 See Michael Kanellos, Court Lifts Injunction in Intel-lntegraph Case, NEWS.COM, Nov.
5, 1999, at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-232538.html?legacy-cnet (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); Matt
Loney, EC to Drop Intel Antitrust Investigation, ZDNET, Feb. 4, 2002, at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2I03680,00.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); Jennifer
Disabatino, FTC Closes Intel Investigation, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 26, 2000, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/legalissues/story/0, 10801,51253,00.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
9 See Stipulation, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999) (No.
98-1232), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9462.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003);
Press Release, European Commission, Commission Initiates Additional Proceedings against Microsoft
(Aug. 30, 2001), http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index en.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2001) (on
file with Yale Journal on Regulation). Other relevant documents may be found at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/msindex.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
10 See Nora Macaluso, U.S. Wants Details on HotJobs-Monster.coin Merger, E-COMMERCE
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into online broker-dealers (six separate U.S. regulatory investigations and
one European investigation looked into anti-competitive behavior in two-
sided e-dealer markets)." In some cases the multi-sided nature of the
market was central to, the allegations in the antitrust case, 12 while in others
it provided an important backdrop for understanding the workings of the
business.
13
Despite their economic importance, multi-sided markets have only
recently received attention from economists and, with the exception of
some recent work on payment cards, have received virtually no attention in
the scholarly literature on antitrust.14 This Article explains the economics
of multi-sided platform markets and examines its implications for antitrust
analysis. Part II defines the necessary conditions for the emergence of
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/l2785.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2003).
11 See Update l-BrokerTec Says Profitable since Q4 of 2001, REUTERS NEWS, June 6,
2002, in FORBES.COM, at http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2002/06/l0/rtr627112.html (last visited
June 10, 2002) (on file with Yale Journal on Regulation); see also Chris Sanders, BrokerTec Confirms
Probe by US Antitrust Official, REUTERS NEWS, May 16, 2002; Online Trading Draws Greater
Scrutiny, REUTERS NEWS, in CNET.COM, May 17, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-
916334.html?legacy=cnet&tag=lh (last visited Aug. 21, 2001).
12 The credit card investigations involved the pricing structure used to balance the two-sided
demand. See Christian Ahlbom et al., The Problem of Interchange Fee Analysis. Case Without a
Cause?, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 304, 305 (2001). The U.S. Microsoft case included the claim
that one side of the market (applications) was the source of a barrier to entry. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft 111). For other relevant documents, see
the DOJ Web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
13 For example, current investigations into online bond and currency exchanges are
examining how dealers encourage the use of their trading platforms among buyers and sellers. See
Chris Sanders, Analysis-Investigators Sniff Out Online Trading, Again, REUTERS NEWS, May 16,
2002; Sanders, supra note 11. As another example, the European Commission was concerned that the
AOL/Time Warner merger would create a dominant platform in a two-sided market. The concern was
that the merged company could use its allegedly dominant position in on-line music content: AOL,
through its contractual agreements with Bertelsmann, a German media group, and Time Warner would
have had a combined share of thirty to forty percent of music content in Europe according to the
Commission. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Opens Full Investigation into
AOL/Time Warner Merger (Oct. 19, 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comnm/competition/indexen.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2003); see also EEC Regulation No. 4064/89, Merger Procedure, Art. 8(2) 46 (Nov.
10, 2000).
14 The general economics of multi-sided markets are discussed in a seminal paper by Jean-
Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets, J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N (forthcoming Spring 2003) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole,
Platform]. See also BERNARD CAILLAUD & BRUNO JULLIEN, CHICKEN & EGG: COMPETING
MATCHMAKERS (Ctr. For Econ. Polity Research, Working Paper No. 2885, 2001); BRUNO JULLIEN,
COMPETING IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: DIVIDE AND CONQUER (Institut D'Economie Industrielle,
Working Paper No. 9, 2001); Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Unbundling in the
Presence of Network Externalities (June 14, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal
on Regulation). Many of the notions discussed in this Article were first introduced in papers that
analyzed the payment card industry as a two-sided market. See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean
Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors. Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J.
ECON. 549 (2002) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, Cooperation]; Richard Schmalensee, Payment
Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 103 (2002). This work is based in part on notions
that were first recognized in W. F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper.- Legal and
Economic Perspectives, 23 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983).
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multi-sided platform businesses and then describes the profit-maximizing
business strategies for these platforms. Part III discusses the implications
of these features of multi-sided markets for antitrust analysis. It shows how
standard market definition, unilateral effects, predatory pricing, vertical
restraints, and coordinated effects analyses must be modified to take into
account the multi-sided nature of these markets. Part IV presents
conclusions.
The economics of multi-sided platform markets brings to light a novel
understanding of the pricing, production, and investment decisions of
those businesses. A fundamental insight of the theoretical research is that
these businesses need to determine an optimal pricing structure-one that
balances the relative demands of the multiple customer groups-as well as
optimal pricing levels. That insight has implications for many other
strategic variables. Empirical examination of these industries finds that key
business decisions are driven by the need to get critical levels of multiple
customer groups on board and to balance complementary customer
communities.' s Antitrust analysis should always pay careful attention to
the market context in which it is being applied. One size does not fit all.
The theory and empirics of multi-sided platform markets provide guidance
for the analysis of competitive practices in platform markets.
I. Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets
A. Necessary Conditions for the Emergence of a Platform Business
A platform can increase social surplus when three necessary
conditions are met:
16
(1) There are two or more distinct groups of customers. In some
cases, these customers are immutably different entities-men and women;
shopping mall retailers and customers; individuals who have debit cards,
merchants who take debit cards; software developers and software users.
In other cases, these customers are different only for the purpose of the
15 David S. Evans & Marco lansiti, Harnessing the Power of Market Platforms (Jan. 7,
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
16 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 35 ("A market with network
externalities is a two-sided market if platforms can effectively cross-subsidize between different
categories of end users that are parties to a transaction"); MARK ARMSTRONG, COMPETITION IN TWO-
SIDED MARKETS 3 (Nuffield College, Oxford, Working Paper, 2002) ("[Two-sided] markets or
institutions involv[e] two groups of participants, say group I and group 2, who interact via
intermediaries. Surplus is created-or destroyed in the case of negative externalities-when I and 2
interact, but this interaction must be mediated in some way"); Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at
6-7 ("Our distinction is that network effects must cross market populations .... [[in two-sided
networks coordination across markets matters"). For a discussion of these issues in the specific context
of payment cards, see generally Rochet & Tirole, Cooperation, supra note 14, at 549-52; Jean-Charles
Rochet, The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions 2-7 (Jan. 7, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
Yale Journal on Regulation
transaction at hand--eBay users are sometimes buyers, sometimes sellers;
mobile phone users are sometimes callers, sometimes receivers. In many
cases, members of customer group A consume a different product than
members of customer group B; these products are related by the second
condition.
(2) There are externalities associated with customers A and B
becoming connected or coordinated in some fashion. A shopper benefits
when she can shop at her favorite retail store at the mall next door; a
retailer benefits from being in a location that attracts such shoppers. A
cardholder benefits when a merchant takes his card for payment; a
merchant benefits when a cardholder has a form of payment he accepts.
Although not necessary for a platform to arise, the presence of indir~et
network effects seems to explain empirically why a platform emerges.
Indirect network effects 17 occur when the value obtained by one kind of
customer increases with measures of the other kind of customer. 8 Video
game developers value video game consoles more when they have more
game users; game users value consoles that have more games. Sellers of
antique harpoons value exchanges that have more people who would like
to buy harpoons, and vice versa. Generally, in matchmaking markets
customers of each type benefit from being able to search a larger group of
customers of the other type for a suitable match. They also benefit from
being able to search among a group that has been narrowed to suitable
matches.
(3) An intermediary is necessary to internalize the externalities
created by one group for the other group. If the members of group A and
group B could enter into bilateral transactions, they would be able to
internalize the indirect externalities under Condition 2. Information and
17 Direct network effects arise when the value of a good increases with the number of
people using that good. For example, a word processing package is more valuable to people if more
people use it to the extent that standardization makes it easier to exchange documents. However, direct
network effects often can be interpreted as indirect network effects. For example, the network effects
for word processing packages arise mainly because people who use the package to "write" value it
more if more people can use the package to "read." To take another example, economists often use
telecommunications networks as examples of direct network effects: Each user of a
telecommunications network benefits when more people also use that network because that user can
connect to more people. There are, however, two distinct groups of consumers: senders and receivers.
The distinction is material because operators of communications networks can and do establish
separate prices for making versus receiving a call. See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 36
n.26; see also DOH-SHIN JEON ET AL., ON THE RECEIVER PAYS PRINCIPLE (Dep't of Econ. and Bus.,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Working Paper, 2001), available at
http://www.econ.upf.es/deehome/what/wpapers/postscripts/561.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) (on file
with Yale Journal on Regulation).
18 Ordinarily the measure will involve the quality-adjusted number of other companies
where the quality adjustment may be based on size, variety, or some other quality dimension. Wal-
Mart is more important than the Sheboygan Hardware Store for credit card holders; wealthier




transaction costs as well as free-riding make it difficult in practice for
members of distinct customer groups to internalize the externalities on
their own. This is especially true when the externalities arise from indirect
network effects.' 9 Men could in theory go around a singles bar and pay
women to consider them as romantic prospects, but it tends not to happen.
The intermediary does not have to be a business in the usual sense; it
could be an institution or set of rules. Consider paper money: It is more
valuable to customers as a medium of exchange if more merchants take it
and vice versa. Laws requiring that paper money be accepted to settle
debts and institutions bolstering the government as a credible backer of
paper money help get both sides on board.20 The existence of indirect
network externalities, however, provides profit opportunities for
entrepreneurs to establish a platform that couples multiple customer
groups. Exploiting these profit opportunities requires entrepreneurs to find
pricing, product, and investment strategies to balance the interests of the
many market sides.2 '
An intermediary does not necessarily arise to solve the externality
problem. Businesses may engage in tacit coordination. The music industry,
for instance, manages to produce content for CDs, the CDs themselves,
and the components to play CDs without much explicit coordination. In
other cases, businesses may solve the problem through vertical integration
into one side of the market. For example, Bill Gates faced the following
problem at Microsoft: "In 1989, 1 personally went to all the applications
developers and asked them to write applications for Microsoft Windows.
They wouldn't do it." 2 His solution was simple: "So I went to the
19 Consider the tbllowing example from Rochet and Tirole. Suppose that there were no
fixed costs of having or taking payment cards. If a cardholder and merchant could negotiate a fee
between themselves for the joint net benefit of using cards then they would internalize the externality.
See Rochet & Tirole, Platforn, supra note 14, at 35-36. In practice, however, most merchants do not
pass along the extra fees associated with taking payment cards to cardholders even in those situations
in which such surcharging is permitted by law or by the rules of the card company. See Alan S.
Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUS'r L.J. 313
(1998).
20 U.S. coin and currency are, by law, legal tender for payment of all debts in the United
States. Bureau bf Engraving and Printing, Legal Tender: A Definition, at
http://www.bep.treas.gov/document.cfmi/18/110 (last visited Jan. 22, 2002). This does not mean,
however, that merchants are under legal obligation to accept cash for payment. For example, some
businesses do not take pennies, and certain merchants do not accept cash and only allow credit card
transactions. Thus, the laws encourage the use of cash generally but do not specifically mandate
merchant acceptance, leaving businesses free to form their own payment guidelines. U.S. Treasury,
FAQs: Currency, at http://www.ustreas.gov/education/faq/currency/legal-tender.htm (last visited Jan.
22, 2002). The National Bank Act of 1864 established a national banking system and specified the
issuance of banknotes backed by government bonds. Kurt Schuler, Note Issue by Banks: A Step
Toward Free Banking in the United States?, 20 CATO J. 453, 456 (2001).
21 1 discuss what I mean by "balance the interests" below. See infra Part 11.
22 Jerry Poumelle, Jerry's Take on the Microsoft Decision: Wrong!, BYTE.COM, Nov. 8,
1999, at http://joumals2.iranscience.net:800/www.byte.com/www.byte.com/documents/s=200/
byt19991108s0001/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); see also W. E. PETE PETERSON, ALMOST
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Microsoft Applications Group, and they didn't have that option., 23 Even
today, when the Windows operating system is a well-established platform,
Microsoft continues to produce some of the most important applications
for Windows.24
Determining when indirect network effects result in the formation of
a platform business and whether platforms (versus tacit coordination or
integration) are a more socially efficient method for dealing with these
effects would be a rewarding topic for further research. This Article,
however, focuses on industries in which platform businesses are the
dominant mode of organization for internalizing externalities.
B. Types of Multi-Sided Platforn Businesses
There are three major kinds of multi-sided platforms:
(1) Market-Makers enable members of distinct groups to transact with
each other. Each member of a group values the service more highly if there
are more members of the other group, thereby increasing the likelihood of
a match and reducing the time it takes to find an acceptable match.
Shopping malls, for example, are more valuable to customers if there are
more retail shops at which they can make purchases and more valuable to
retail shops if there are more customers who are likely to buy their
products. 25 Not surprisingly, shopping mall developers try to create
"upscale" or "downscale" malls to match customers and shops. EBay
started out as a meeting place for people who wanted to buy or sell Pez
dispensers.27 It has grown to provide a meeting place for people who want
to buy or sell many different kinds of goods.28 Much of its efforts have
gone into improving the quality of the match by, for example, aggregating
information on repeat sellers from buyers.29 NASDAQ and dating services
such as Yahoo! Personals are similar examples of market-makers.30
PERFECT ch. 7 (1998), available at http://fitnesoft.com/AlmostPerfect/apchap07.html (last visited Jan.
24, 2003) (Pete Peterson, one of the founders of WordPerfect, noted, "Whenever a customer or a writer
from the press asked me if we intended to support Windows . . . . [W]e knew Microsoft wanted
Windows to succeed, a feat which would require the development of Windows-based applications ....
I was not going to encourage SSI to accept their [Microsoft's] offer if there was any hope that another
company might give us a ride.").
23 Poumelle, supra note 22.
24 See Microsoft, Microsoft Office, at http://www.microsoft.com/office/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2003).
25 See B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities.- The Pricing of Space
in Shopping Malls, 41 1.L. & ECON. 115, 116 (1998).
26 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Malls Hope Make-Overs Will Attract the Affluent, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1995, at D4.
27 Sam Jaffe, Online Extra: eBay: From Pez to Profits, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, May 14, 2001,
at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_20/b3732616.htm.
28 See EBAY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2002); eBay, Company Overview, at
http://pages.ebay.com/community/aboutebay/overview/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
29 See eBay, Services, at http://pages.ebay.com/services/index.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
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(2) Audience-Makers match advertisers to audiences. Advertisers
value a service more if there are more members of an audience who will
react positively to their messages; audiences value a service more if there
is more useful "content" provided by audience-makers. 3 Advertising-
supported media such as magazines, newspapers, free television, yellow
pages, and many Internet portals are audience makers.32 Yellow pages, for
example, are more valuable to customers if more companies provide
information and are more valuable to companies if more customers see the
messages.33 Free television is more valuable to advertisers if there are
more viewers. Like many media, though, viewers come mainly for the
"content"-the shows-and view the advertisements because it is too
costly to avoid them.
34
(3) Demand-Coordinators make goods and services that generate
indirect network effects across two or more groups. These platforms do not
strictly sell "transactions" like a market maker or "messages" like an
audience-maker; they are a residual category much like irregular verbs-
numerous, heterogeneous, and important. Software platforms such as
Windows and the Palm OS, payment systems such as credit cards, and
mobile telephones are demand coordinators.3  Payment card platforms, for
example, enable cardholders and merchants to consummate transactions
using a payment card. This involves providing distinct services to
cardholders and merchants designed to stimulate demand for the card. For
example, even without using financing features, cardholders receive credit
services since they have several weeks to pay for a purchase with most
credit -and charge cards, and merchants also often receive detailed
2003).
30 See Pashigian & Gould, supra note 25, at 116; NASDAQ, About NASDAQ, at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/marketcharacteristics.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003); Yahoo!, Yahoo!
Personals Home Page, at http://personals.yahoo.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
31 See RONALD GOETTLER, ADVERTISING RATES, AUDIENCE COMPOSITION, AND
COMPETITION IN THE NETWORK TELEVISION INDUSTRY I (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Graduate Sch. of
Indus. AdminWorking Paper No. 1999-E28, 1999).
32 James Ferguson, for example, states that:
In a fundamental sense, what advertisers demand, and what the various advertising
media outlets supply, are units of audience for advertising messages. Thus
advertiser demand for space in the print media and time in the broadcast media is a
derived demand stemming from a demand for audience, and is a positive function
of the size and quality of audience.
James M. Ferguson, Daily Newspaper Advertising Rates, Local Media Cross-Ownership, Newspaper
Chains, and Media Competition, 26 J.L. ECON. 635, 637 (1983).
33 MARC RYSMAN, COMPETITION BETWEEN NETWORKS: A STUDY OF THE MARKET FOR
YELLOW PAGES 1-2 (Boston Univ. Indus. Studies Project, Working Paper No. 104, 2002). Yellow
Pages straddle the market-maker and audience-maker categories. They help connect buyers and sellers.
More so than other audience-maker platforms, Yellow Pages readers are likely to value the
advertisements; the advertisements are an important aspect of the content.
34 See GOETTLER, supra note 31, at 2-4.
35 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 30-31, 34-35.
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accounting information. 36  Software platforms coordinate users and
developers. The platform includes features that many software developers
and end users want to avail themselves of and therefore economizes on the
production of these features.37 Such features are more valuable to
developers if more computer users rely on the platform and are more
valuable to computer users if more applications run on the platform.38
Table I provides further examples of multi-sided platform markets
and businesses that participate in these markets. While by no means
exhaustive, it illustrates the variety of multi-sided platform industries.
C. Multi-Sided Versus Single-Sided Markets
Since most markets have distinct consumer types-teenagers or
retirees, households or businesses, men or women-can existing theories
fully explain the economics of platform businesses and multi-sided
markets? Multi-sided markets differ from the traditional single-sided
markets because platform businesses have to serve two or more of these
distinct types of consumers to generate demand from any of them. Hair
salons can cater to men, women, or both. Heterosexual dating clubs have
to cater to men and women.
Methods of price discrimination provide another useful comparison
between single-sided and multi-sided markets. Businesses in single-sided
and multi-sided markets engage in price discrimination because it is
possible to increase revenue by doing so and because, in the case of
businesses with extensive scale economies, it may be the only way to
cover fixed costs.3 9 A dating club may charge men a higher price just
because they have more inelastic demand and because it is easy to identify
consumers on the basis of sex. 40 But businesses in multi-sided markets
36 See generally DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 92, 111-12 (1999).
37 For a definition of software platform, see WEBOPEDIA at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/platform.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
38 "The more users [the platform] has, the more developers will write applications for it,
which in turn attracts more users, and so on." Extending Its Tentacles, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2001, at
60, available at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=822234 (last visited Jan. 30,
2003).
39 For a discussion of price discrimination in one-sided markets, see DENNIS W. CARLTON
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 274-96 (2000).
40 Some dating clubs-e.g., exclusive discotheques-have someone who screens the line to
make sure that the "right" people get in and in the right proportions. Even at constant prices some
"selectors" go through the line and skip over single men for single women. Such non-price rationing is
another method to deal with the two-sided nature of the market. Also, price may be used as a screen for
other characteristics; for example, one reader suggested that dating clubs may charge men higher prices





Table 1. Sources of Platform Revenue in Selected Two-Sided Platforms
Two-Sided Side that Gets
Industry Platform Side One Side Two Charged Little Sources of Revenue
Real Residential Buyer Seller Side One Real estate brokers derive income
Estate Property principally from sales
Brokerage commissions.'
Real Apartment Renter Owner/ Typically Apartment consultants and locater
Estate Brokerage Landlord Side One services generally receive all of
their revenue from the apartment
lessors once they have successfully
found tenants for the landlord.2
Media Newspapers Reader Advertiser Side One Approximately 80 percent of
and newspaper revenue comes from
Magazines advertisers.
3
Media Network Viewer Advertiser Side One For example, the FOX television
Television network earns its revenues primarily
from advertisers.4
Media Portals and Web Advertiser Side One For example, Yahoo! earns 75
Web Pages "Surfer" percent of its revenues from
advertising.
Software Operating Application Application Side Two For example, Microsoft earns at
System User Developer least 67 percent of its revenues from
licensing packaged software to end-
users.
6
Software Video Game Game Game Neither- Both game sales to end users and
Console Player Developer Both sides are licensing to third party developers
a significant are significant sources of revenue
source of for console manufacturers. Console
platform manufacturers have sold their video
revenue. game consoles near or below
marginal cost (not taking into
account research and development).
Microsoft, for instance, is selling its
Xbox for at least $125 below
marginal cost. 8
Payment Credit Card Cardholder Merchant Side One For example, in 2001, American
Card Express earned 82 percent of its
System revenues from merchants, excluding
finance charge revenue.
Sources: (1) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Real Estate Brokers and
Sales Agents, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocosl20.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2002); (2) Courtney Ronan, Apartment
Locaters: How Do They Make Their Money?, REALTY TIMES, June 30, 1998, at
http://realtytimes.com/rtnews/rtcpages/19980630 aptlocator.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002); (3) LISA
GEORGE & JOEL WALDFOGEL, WHOM BENEFITS WHOM IN DAILY NEWSPAPER MARKETS? I I (Nat'l
Bur. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7944, 2000); (4) FOX Entm't Group, 2000 Annual Report 26,
available at http://www.newscorp.com/feg/foxReport2000/in-m-d-a.htm; (5) Yahoo!, 2001 Annual
Report 29, available at http://docs.yahoo.com/info/investor/ar0l/yahooar20Ol.pdf; (6) IDC, 1994
WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE REVIEW AND FORECAST (IDC 9358, Nov. 1994); IDC, 1995 WORLDWIDE
SOFTWARE REVIEW AND FORECAST (IDC 10460, Nov. 1995); IDC, 1996 WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE
REVIEW AND FORECAST (IDC 12408, Nov. 1996); IDC, 1997 WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE REVIEW AND
FORECAST (IDC 14327, Oct. 1997); IDC, 1999 WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE REVIEW AND FORECAST (IDC
20161, Oct. 1999); IDC, WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE MARKET FORECAST SUMMARY, 2001-2005 (IDC
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25569, Sept. 2001); (7) David Becker, Revenue from Game Consoles will Plunge, Report Predicts,
CNET.COM, Jul. 31, 2000, at http://techrepublic-cnet.com.com/2100-1040-243841.htmllegacy-cnet
(last visited Aug. 5, 2002); (8) Rob Fahey, MS to Lose £525M on Xbox This Year, Gamelndustry.biz,
June 26,2002, at http://www.gamesindustry.biz/content-page.php?section-name=pub&aid=210; (9)
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 35, available at http://www.onlineproxy.com/
amex/2002/ar/pdf/axpar 2001 .pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
have an additional reason: By charging one group a lower price the
business can charge another group a higher price; and unless prices are low
enough to attract enough of the former group, the business cannot obtain
sales at all.41 A dating club has a reason to charge men a higher price if too
many men show up compared to women at equal prices.42
Like firms in multi-sided markets, many firms in single-sided markets
sell multiple products, and there is an extensive economic literature
explaining why they do SO. 4 3 On the cost side, there may be economies of
scope from having one firm produce multiple products. Automobile
manufacturers can use the same production technology for making cars
and trucks. American Express can use the same computer system for
providing services to cardholders and merchants. On the demand side,
there are advantages to pricing complementary products together.44 These
standard explanations for why firms produce multiple products probably
apply to many of the platforms discussed here. But firms that make
multiple products for several one-sided markets (e.g., General Electric
makes light bulbs and turbine engines45) or several complementary
products for a distinct set of consumers (e.g., IBM sells computer
hardware and computer services4 6) do not secure profit opportunities from
internalizing indirect network effects.
Multi-sided platform markets, on the other hand, are subject to
indirect network effects. A lengthy literature in economics, dating back to
41 This is different from the joint pricing of complements analyzed by Coumot or the
standard razor-blade example discussed in Allen. See AUGUSTIN A. COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99-116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans.,
Macmillan 1897) (1897); see also ROY G. D. ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS
361-62 (1938). In those cases, a multi-product business sets prices to a given group of consumers for
whom these products are complements; the price for one good may be less than marginal cost because
it stimulates consumption of the other good.
42 Or vice versa. The dating agency Dinner for Six waives a $150 joining fee for men over
50-apparently because they are scarce relative to women over 50 looking for mates. See Victoria
Button, Dating Agency Seeks Fees Based on Age, Gender, THE AGE, Sept. 24, 1997, at 3.
43 See. e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 65-79, 157-60 (1982); John C. Panzar, Technological Determinants of Firms
and Industry Structure, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a
Communications Service, 5 BELL J. ECON. 16 (1974).
44 That was first recognized by Cournot in 1838 and now goes by the unhelpful name of
"double marginalization." See COURNOT, supra note 41, at 99-116.
45 See General Electric Company, Home Page, at http://www.ge.com/en/index2.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
46 See IBM, Home Page, at http://www.ibm.com/products/us/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
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the mid-1980s, analyzes the economic implication of these effects.4 7 That
literature considers first-mover advantages,48  the difficulties of
coordinating the production of complementary products, 49 and problems
that result from markets tipping to a possibly bad technology or having so
much inertia that they cannot move to a better technology.5 ° The literature
does not, however, consider the economics of businesses that harness these
indirect network effects through the creation of a multi-sided platform. 5'
Related work examines the role of cooperation among businesses to
produce complements but does not consider the role of platform businesses
as such.52
D. Profit-Maximizing Pricing by Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
The special problems that platform firms must solve are best
developed by considering their pricing strategies. To simplify the
terminology, consider a two-sided market in which both sides are
purchasing goods that have the same metric-such as a transaction or a
date.53 The platform business faces two demand curves, each of which
depends on the quality-adjusted quantity purchased on the other side. The
platform incurs a fixed cost for operating the platform and variable costs
for servicing each side.
The optimal price for side A depends on the responsiveness of
demand to changes in price on side A, the responsiveness of demand on
side B to changes in quality-adjusted sales on side A, and changes in
47 For a discussion of network effects, see Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93
[hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems]; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the
Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro,
Technology]; S.J. Liebowitz & S.E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133.
48 See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, Technology, supra note 47, at 825; see also David Gabel,
Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry. 1894-1910, 54 J. ECON. HisT. 543, 560-
66(1994).
49 E.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 227-59 (1999).
50 E.g., Katz & Shapiro, Systems, supra note 47, at 108. For an alternative view, see David
S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, ANTITRUST,
Spring 1996, at 36.
51 Stanley Liebowitz has argued that the prescriptive advice that businesses took from this
literature-and in some cases were given specifically by economists who contributed to this
literature-contributed to the failure of many dot corns. The network effects literature focuses on
building market share quickly through penetration pricing strategies. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ, RE-
THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY: THE TRUE FORCES THAT DRIVE THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 26-
49 (2002).
52 See ADAM M. BRANDERBURGER ET AL., CO-OPETITION 11-22 (1998).
53 More generally, platform businesses-especially audience makers and demand-
coordinators-are selling different products to the different sides. For some of the points below one
would have to transform prices into a measure that applies to both sides (for example, contribution to
margin or profit).
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variable costs on both sides. To see this, suppose we have found the
optimal prices for sides A and B. An increase from the optimal price on
side A, holding the optimal price on side B constant, will have the
following effects: Demand on side A will fall, demand on side B will fall
since side B's product is less valuable, variable costs will fall on side A
and variable costs will fall on side B. Therefore, all of those factors have to
be taken into account when searching for the optimal price pair. (The same
intuition applies to discovering the social welfare-maximizing price.)
1. Pricing by a Multi-Sided Platform Facing Multiplicative
Demand
All of the theoretical models of pricing by platforms in multi-sided
markets confirm this intuition.5 4 Here we consider the Rochet-Tirole
model, which is motivated by payment cards. The model assumes that the
total demand facing the platform increases proportionately with the
number of merchants and the number of cardholders. A simple regression
provides some support for this assumption. Based on annual data from
1981 to 2001 for Visa, a regression of the log of the number of
transactions against the log of the number of merchants and the log of the
number of cardholders yields:
55
log(transactions) = -8.49 + 1.73 - log(merchants) + 0.84
log(cardholders)
A coefficient of I on each variable would indicate that transactions were
exactly proportional to the relevant variable. These results indicate that
transactions increase somewhat more than proportionately with the number
of merchants and just slightly less than proportionately with the number of
cardholders.56 This model also describes many matchmaking services.57
More dates will result when there are more men and women in a club.
54 The equilibrium conditions noted in the literature all illustrate the dependence of one side
of the market on another. See, e.g., Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 10-12, 18-21 (deriving
four equations that show mathematically how one side of the market depends on the other);
Schmalensee, supra note 14, at 111-18; Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 11.
55 Data was collected from various Nilson Report issues from 1982 to 2002 (Nos. 285, 338,
347, 372, 374, 406, 422, 456, 475, 500, 522, 545, 569, 591, 617, 640, 664, 689, 712, 738, 760). The
estimated coefficients were significant at the ninety-nine percent level. The standard errors of
log(merchants) and log(cardholders) equal 0.25 and 0.3, respectively; R2 equals 0.97.
56 The coefficients imply that a ten percent increase in cardholders corresponds to a
seventeen percent increase in transactions and a ten percent increase in merchants corresponds to an
8.5 percent increase in transactions.
57 This is true only within limits. Especially when a matchmaking service occurs in a
physical location-a dating club, a trading pit, or a flea market-congestion makes search harder,
thereby offsetting the gains from more potential partners.
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More transactions will take place on exchanges that have more buyers and
sellers.
While the results do not fit the Rochet-Tirole formulation precisely,
they suggest that a multiplicative demand function is a reasonable
simplifying assumption. Specifically, the Rochet-Tirole model assumes
total demand, DT, is given by:
DT = Dj(pj)xD 2(P2) (1)
Here, the subscripts indicate the respective sides of the market, so that
D1(p1) denotes the demand on side I of the market, which depends on the
price on side 1, and similarly for side 2. Although simple, this demand
structure captures the key interaction between the two market sides from
the standpoint of the platform. More complex and realistic demand
structures would be less tractable but would yield qualitatively similar
results.5 8 In particular, making one side's demand depend on the demand
for the other side would strengthen the result, presented below, that
relative prices between the two sides depend on relative demand, not on
costs.
59
Rochet and Tirole assume that there is a per unit (variable) cost of a
transaction equal to c. Note that this variable cost is incurred when a
transaction takes place and is therefore not attributable to either side alone.
In fact, much of the costs of payment card transactions is either joint, in
the sense that the costs arise when a transaction occurs (the cost of
authorization and settlement), or the allocation of costs to one side or the
other is economically arbitrary (the cost of funds, charge-offs, fraud, and
other risks).60
The first condition in Rochet-Tirole for a monopolist in a two-sided
market is that the total price, PT, is given by:
61
58 Note that the multiplicative structure does not imply that each cardholder buys from each
merchant, since total demand could be scaled down by any constant factor and all the results below
would still obtain. Note also that the respective merchant and cardholder bases could be defined in
terms of the dollar volume of transactions accounted for by merchants and cardholders rather than a
straight headcount of merchants and cardholders.
59 With the structure in Equation 1, an increase in demand on side one, for example, affects
total output through the multiplicative interaction. If demand on side two increased as a result of higher
demand on side one, that would further increase total output; prices on each side would therefore need
to take into account that additional interaction.
Parker & Van Alystne take the alternative approach of making total demand additive rather than
multiplicative and assuming that demand on each side does depend on demand on the other side. They
obtain results that are similar to those of Rochet & Tirole in that prices on each side depend on demand
conditions on the two sides, specifically the externalities between the two sides. Parker & Van Alstyne,
supra note 14, at 14.
60 For issuers, almost three quarters of operating costs are for cost of funds, charge-offs, and
fraud. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 214.
61 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 9-10.
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(PT- c)/PT = 1/11 (2)
Here c is the per unit (variable) cost of a transaction on the platform, and
PT IS equal to the sum of pt and P2. The expression on the left-hand side
gives the total price-cost margin charged by the firm. The term q on the
right-hand side is a measure of "elasticity" or the responsiveness of
demand on the two sides to changes in price.62 The condition indicates
that, as the responsiveness of demand increases, the price-cost margin
falls. Roughly speaking, as consumer sensitivity to prices increases, the
price a monopolist gets to charge falls.
This result is analogous to the familiar Lerner condition for monopoly
pricing in one-sided markets. 6' As far as the overall price level is
concerned, two-sided pricing is similar to one-sided pricing. The
difference, however, is that two-sided pricing must involve a price
structure that divides total price between the two sides of the system.
Consider the impact on total demand from a small change in the price of,
for example, side 1. With proportional demand, the change in total demand
is proportional to the percent change in demand on side 1:64
ADT = (AD(p,)/D,(p))XDT (3)
If a monopolist is maximizing profits, it must be unable to do better by
raising prices slightly on one side and decreasing prices by the same
amount on the other side. That is, the impact on total demand must be the
same from changing prices on either side. Equation 3 above implies that
the percentage change in demand on each side must be equal, because total
demand will change by exactly that percentage. Formally, this means
that:6"
ADj(p)/D,(p,) = AD 2(p2)/D2(p2) (4)
In equilibrium, the ratio of the prices on the two sides is proportional to the
ratio of the elasticities of demand on the two sides.66
62 To be precise il = )1 + '12 where the tl, are given by the standard elasticity formulae, 1i = -
pj'(dD/dp)/D.
63 The Lemer condition was first stated in Abba Lemer, The Concept of Monopoly and the
Measurement of Monopoly Power, I REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF,
supra note 39, at 91-92.
64 For ease of exposition, I express the changes as discrete rather than differential changes
in demand as is the case in the Rochet-Tirole model.
65 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 9. Rochet & Tirole present a rigorous
derivation of the equilibrium condition derived heuristically here.
66 That is, (p',/rh) = (p2/172), where 7 is the elasticity of demand for each side of the market.
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The most important thing to notice is that Equation 4 does not depend
on variable costs. Consequently, the prices charged to either side do not
depend directly on the variable cost; they only depend on variable cost
through the apportionment of the total price. This is a very different result
than pricing in one-sided markets. For example, in one-sided markets with
heterogeneous customers, businesses might charge different prices. Each
of those prices follows some variant of the Lerner condition, where the
price-cost margin is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand.67
Even pricing in multiproduct firms follows some variant of the Lemer
condition. 68 The key result of the economics of multi-sided platforms is
that the Lerner condition does not hold and, consequently, the profit-
maximizing price of a product does not vary directly with the marginal
cost of product-an otherwise robust result of most economic theories of
pricing.69
2. The Pricing Structure and Indirect Network Externalities
Using a model in which the demand by one side is an increasing
function of the demand on the other side, Geoffrey Parker and Marshall
Van Alstyne show that the relative pricing structure is determined by the
relative indirect network externalities on each side.7° If there are strong
indirect network externalities on both sides, then it will appear as if the
platform business is ignoring them-as it should because they tend to
cancel out. The side with much lower indirect network externalities is
more likely to receive "lower prices" compared with the side with greater
indirect network externalities.7 1
Figure 1, drawn from Parker and Van Alstyne's analysis, describes
three possible equilibria for a monopoly platform. Panels A through C
show the change in prices for the two sides as the externality from side 2
to side I increases. The two lines in each panel are the firm's optimal
choice of price on one side given a price on the other side-the
intersection is the optimal pair for the firm at a given level of externalities
between the two sides. The results in Panels A through C show that as the
effect of side 2 demand on side I demand increases, the price on side 2
decreases. Intuitively, this is because it becomes more profitable for the
firm to "subsidize" price cuts on side 2 if the resulting impact on demand
67 See Lemer, supra note 63, at 157.
68 See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 43, at 243-78.
69 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 246; DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J.
JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 437-38 (1998).
70 See Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 2-3.
71 See Schmalensee, supra note 14, at 113-14; see also Parker & Alstyne, supra note 14, at
12, 14 ("A monopolist that sells to two complementary markets discounts ... the product with the
greater spillover effect.").
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on side I is greater. We see in Panel A, where the externalities are equal
between the two sides, that prices are symmetric. As the externality from
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Note: PI refers to side 1, and P2 to side 2. Panel A shows a symmetric positive price equilibrium,
Panel B shows an asymmetric positive price equilibrium, and Panel C shows a positive/negative price
equilibrium.
Source: Geoffrey G. Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Unbundling in the Presence of Network
Externalities 13 (Aug. 31, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation)
(notation changed from original for ease of exposition).
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side 2 to side I increases, as in Panel B, the price on side 2 decreases and
the price on side I increases. In Panel C, where the externality from side 2
to side I is even greater, we see that it actually makes sense for the firm to
set a negative price on side 2 because of the benefits from stimulating
demand on side 1.
An important result is that the profit-maximizing price structure can
72,
include a negative price on one side. This is similar to the familiar razor
and blade result but arises for a different reason. The razor and blade are
complementary products for an individual consumer. The blade seller
stimulates demand for blades by giving the razor away to the consumer. In
multi-sided platform markets, it is possible that one group of consumers
will get a product for free (or be paid to take it) so that the platform can, in
effect, deliver this group of consumers to the consumers on the other
side(s). I will return to this result in the discussion of predatory pricing in
Part II.C.
3. The Relationship Between Prices and Costs
The relationship between prices and costs in platform businesses is
worth dwelling on since it will prove important for analyzing antitrust and
other public policies. It is well recognized by economists that in multi-
product businesses the allocation of joint costs to a particular product is
arbitrary and that there is no economic rationale behind any proposed
formula for doing so." That proposition is also true for fixed costs that
platform businesses incur for a product or service on just one side of the
market. Incurring these fixed costs enables the business to provide a
product or service that creates demand on the other side. In fact, in some
cases incurring these fixed costs may be essential for there to be any
demand on the other side. Thus, calculations of profit (such as gross
operating margins) based on allocations of fixed costs-either joint or
side-specific-are necessarily arbitrary. Price-marginal cost relationships
for one side do not have any economic meaning either. By themselves they
do not guide the business to profit-maximizing prices or regulators to
social-welfare-maximizing prices. One needs to consider prices and
marginal costs on all sides jointly (along with demand characteristics). The
platform faces a challenging optimization problem, and the regulator an
onerous information problem.
72 See CAILLAUD & JULLIEN, supra note 14, at 24.
73 See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
78 (1989); W. Baurnol et al., How Arbitrary is Arbitrary-or. Toward the Deserved Demise of Full
Cost Allocation, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 3, 1987, at 16-21.
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4. Pricing with Platform Competition
Pricing considerations are broadly similar when there are competing
firms selling to multiple sides of the market.74 Rochet and Tirole consider
an interesting case of this, which they refer to as "multihoming ' '75-
consumers on one or more sides of the market rely on more than one seller
of multi-sided services."' Most platforms face competition on at least one
side, as noted in Table 2, so multihoming is prevalent. Many cardholders
have cards issued by and many merchants accept cards from several
competing platforms-an example of multihoming on both sides.77
Developers of applications for operating systems or game consoles
generally write for multiple platforms, while most people use only one
computer operating system or game console-an example of multihoming
on just one side.7"
Multihoming affects both the price level and the pricing structure. Not
surprisingly, the price level tends to be lower with multihoming because
the availability of substitutes tends to put pressure on the multi-sided firms
to lower their prices.79 The seller has more options when dealing with a
multihomed buyer on the other side and can select its preferred platform.
As buyer multihoming becomes more prevalent, prices to sellers will tend
to decrease since they have more substitution options. Even when
multihoming is not observed on one side of a multi-sided market, the
possibility of multihoming may have significant consequences for pricing.
The possibility of multihoming may encourage firms to lower their prices
on the side of the market in which multihoming could occur. By lowering
74 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14.
75 "Multihomed" was originally an Internet term. According to Webopedia, an online
technical dictionary, it is "used to describe a host that is connected to two or more networks or having
two or more network addresses. For example, a network server may be connected to a serial line and a
LAN or to' multiple LANs." For a definition of "multihomed," see WEBOPEDIA, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/multihomed.html (last modified Dec. 12, 2002). Rochet and
Tirole adapt the term to describe two-sided networks where a fraction of end users on one or more
sides connect to multiple platforms. See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 5.
76 Parker and Van Alstyne consider a related topic-the situation where a platform business
competes with another firm on just one side of the market. See Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14.
77 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 170.
78 For multihoming in operating system platforms, see Josh Lemer, Did Microsoft Deter
Software Innovation? 31 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation),
available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/workshops/elo/lemer2.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2002); Scot Hacker, He Who Controls the Bootloader, BYTE.COM, at
http://www.byte.com/documents/s=lI 15/byt200O0824sOOOI/0827 hacker.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2002). For multihoming in game console platforms, see Yankee Group: Video-Game Penetration
Grows to 36 Million Households in 2001, REUTERS NEWS, Nov. 19, 2001, available at
http://about.reuters.com/newsreleases/art_19-11-2001-id785.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002); Game
Makers Hedge Bets in Console Wars, USATODAY.COM, Nov. 16, 2001, at
http://www.usatoday.comilife/tech/techreviews/games/2001/11/19/game-makers.htm (last visited Mar.
14, 2003).
79 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 5, 23.
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their prices, they discourage customers on that side from affiliating with
other multi-sided firms. 80 This is not entirely a free lunch for consumers.
The firm can then charge more to customers on the other side(s), for whom
fewer substitutes are available."
Table 2: The Presence of Multihoming in Selected Two-Sided
Platforms
Two-Sided Presence of Multihoming for Side Presence of Multihoming for Side
Platform One Two
Residential Buyer-Uncommon: Multihoming Seller-Uncommon: Multihoming
Property may be unnecessary, since a Multiple may be unnecessary, since an MLS
Brokerage Listing Service ("MLS") allows allows the listed property to be seen by
buyers to see property listed by all all member agencies' customers.'
member agencies.'
Securities Buyer-Common: The average Seller-Common: The average
Brokerage securities brokerage client has securities brokerage client has
accounts at three firms.2 Note that accounts at three firms.2  As
clients can be either or both buyers or mentioned, clients can be either or
sellers. both buyers or sellers.
B2B Buyer-Varies: For example, Seller-Varies: Multihoming may be
multihoming may be unnecessary for unnecessary since the B2B can
some online B2B sites, since buyers inexpensively reach a large audience.
can go directly to the B2B platform
instead of contacting multiple
individual suppliers.
3
P2P Buyer-Varies: Multihoming may be Seller-Varies: Multihoming may be
unnecessary for buyers using online unnecessary for sellers using online
auction sites since eBay holds 85% of auction sites since eBay holds 85% of
the market share (i.e. it seems that the market share (i.e. it seems that
most people purchase their online most people auction their products at
auction products at eBay).5  eBay).5 Alternatively, multihoming
Alternatively, multihoming may be may be more common for online
more common for online dating dating services where there are many
services where there are many sites sites and a large audience of online
and a large audience of online singles singles (considered to be available
(considered to be available singles, as singles, as opposed to sellers).
6
opposed to buyers).
80 Id. at 6.
81 In Jullien's model, when multiple platforms compete and price discrimination between
the two customer types is possible, then prices are lower overall: "This forces the established firm to
set on average prices at a much lower level than it would do with uniform prices. It turns out that it is
impossible for a network to capture in equilibrium the surplus generated by the inter-group network
externalities." JULLIEN, supra note 14, at 4. Jullien assumes the incumbent initially offers uniform
prices, because in his model the two customer types have identical valuations for the network goods
and both receive the same extra value if they both join the same network.
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Two-Sided Presence of Multihoming for Side Presence of Multihoming for Side
Platform One Two
Newspapers Read er-Common: In 1996, the Advertiser-Common: For example,
and average number of magazine issues Sprint advertised in the New York
Magazines read per person per month was 12.3. 7  Times, Wall Street Journal, and
Chicago Tribune, among many other
newspapers, on Aug. 20, 2002.8
Network Viewer-Common: For example, Advertiser-Common: For example,
Television Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Sprint places television advertisements
Houston, among other major on ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC. "0
metropolitan areas, have access to at
least four main network television
channels: ABC, CBS, FOX, and
NBC."
Operating Application User-Unconnion: Application Developer-Common: As
System Individuals typically use only one noted earlier, the number of
operating system.'' developers that develop for various
operating systems indicates that
developers engage in significant
multihoming.'
2
Video Game Player-Varies: A household Game Developer-Common: For
Game that already owns at least one console example, Electronic Arts, a game
Console on average owns 1.4 consoles.)3  developer, develops for Nintendo's
GameCube, Microsoft's Xbox, and
Sony's Playstation 2, among other
consoles. 14
Payment Cardholder-Conumon: Most Merchant-Common: American
Card American Express cardholders also Express cardholders can use Visa and
carry at least one Visa or MasterCard at almost all places that
MasterCard.' 5  take American Express.' 
5
Sources: (1) James R. Frew & G. Donald Jud, Who Pays the Real Estate Broker's
Commission?, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF URBAN PROPERTY
RIGHTS 177, 178 (Austin J. Jaffe & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1987); (2) Susan Scherreik, Is
Your Broker Leaving You Out in the Cold?, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2002,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02 07/b37701 10.htm (last visited Aug. 22,
2002); (3) David Lucking-Reilly & Daniel F. Spulber, Business-to-Business Electronic
Commerce, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2001, at 57-58; (4) FED. TRADE COMM'N,
Efficiencies of B2B Electronic Marketplaces, in 2 ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY:
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES 5 (Oct. 2000),
available at.http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/index.htm#26 (last visited Aug. 14, 2002); (5)
Oscar S. Cisneros, EBay Accused of Monopolization, WIRED NEWS, July 31, 2000,
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,37871,00.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2002); (6) Paul
Festa, Looking for Love Online, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 17, 1996, http://news.com.com/2100-
1023-255523.html?tag=m (last visited Aug. 22, 2002); (7) FOOTE, CONE & BELDING MEDIA
RESEARCH REPORT, MAGAZINES IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Spring 1998), at
http://www.magazine.org/resources/research/fcbmagazinesinfoage.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2003); (8) Sprint, Advertisement, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2002, § 1, at 11; Sprint, Advertisement,
N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2002, at A20; Sprint, Advertisement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2002, at
A15; (9) ABC.com, Local Stations, http://abc.abcnews.go.com/site/localstations.html (last
visited Sept. 3, 2002); CBSNEWS.com, Local CBS Affiliates, http://www.cbsnews.coml/
stories/2002/07/31/utility/main517034.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2002); FOX.com, FOX
Affiliates, http://www.fox.com/links/affiliates.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2002); NBC.com,
Local Stations, http://www.nbc.com/nbc/header/Local_Stations/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2002);




(last visited Aug. 23, 2002); (11) Scot Hacker, He Who Controls the Bootloader, BYTE.COM,
Aug. 27, 2001, at http://joumals2.iranscience.net:800/www.byte.com/www.byte.corn/
documents/s=ll15/byt20010824s0001/default.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2002); (12) Josh
Lemer, Did Microsoft Deter Software Innovation? 31, (May 28, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstractid=269498; (13) Yankee Group.- Video-Game
Penetration Grows to 36 Million Households ii 2001, REUTERS NEWS, Nov. 19, 2001,
http://about.reuters.con/newsreleases/art_ 19-11-2001 id785.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2002);
(14) ELECTRONIC ARTS INC., 2002 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3 (June 28, 2002); (15) DAVID S.
EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN
BUYING AND BORROWING 170 (1999)
5. Complexity and Dynamics
The above economic analysis highlights two important aspects of
platform businesses. Complexity is the first. Firms in single-sided markets
have to search for the best price level which, at a purely theoretical level,
is an easy informational hurdle to surmount. Firms can adjust price,
observe the effect on sales, and measure the direct correspondence to
production costs. Firms in multi-sided markets, however, have to search
for two or more interdependent price levels and discern the interaction
effects. They also have to worry about instabilities: Seemingly small
changes on one side can have dramatic changes on the other side due to the
resulting interactions. For example, Yahoo operated an Internet auction
site that, in 2000, was second only to eBay in number of listings. It was
able to reach that level because, unlike eBay, Yahoo did not charge sellers
a fee for listing their products. When Yahoo attempted to charge sellers for
listings in early 2001, its listings fell by ninety percent, leaving little for
buyers to bid on.82 Presumably, sellers concluded that if they had to pay
for offering a product in an online auction, they would be better off
focusing on the largest venue, eBay.
Not surprisingly, many successful platform businesses have
developed gradually through a process of trial and error. For example,
Diners' Club-the first charge card that could be used at multiple
merchants-began by providing a card product for paying at restaurants in
New York. It expanded the restaurant model to Los Angeles, and then to
travel and entertainment businesses nationwide. 83 EBay-while operating
on Internet time-expanded from Pez dispensers to more than 18,000 item
categories sold worldwide.84 Examples of the reverse situation, in which
businesses have gotten their structure wrong, are readily available. B2B
82 Saul Hansell, Red Facefor the Internet's Blue Chip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1.
83 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 62-65.
84 See EBAY, supra note 28.
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exchanges invested in substantial infrastructures to make markets,
established a pricing scheme, and opened to find few takers.8"
The practical complexity of getting all sides on board may explain
why real-world multi-sided platform markets do not appear "tippy." Some
economists argued from theory that customers would stampede toward the
network with the greatest number of members. Therefore, if one network
got even a small lead over another network the market would tip to the
former, which would then achieve ubiquity.86 In practice, successful multi-
sided platforms evolve relatively slowly as businesses grope for the
optimal pricing structure and gradually develop customers on all sides of
the market. 87 Aspiring platforms that have heeded the prescriptive advice
of network economics-build share early and quickly-have not done
well.88
Critical mass is the second important challenge for platform
businesses and is a key start-up issue. Known in the literature as the
chicken-and-egg problem, the name does not do the problem justice. In
some situations coupled products cannot come into existence without a
sufficient number of customers on both sides from the start. Payment cards
are the clearest example: The card is worthless to individuals if few
merchants take it and is worthless to merchants if few individuals use it.
Among electronic exchanges, the B2B platform discussed above is again
relevant, since neither buyers nor sellers showed up in sufficient numbers
to make either side interested.89
Sometimes, though, platforms can evolve sequentially by providing
products and services to build up one customer base before pursuing the
second. The evolution of Microsoft's software platform is an example. The
early versions of DOS offered relatively few services to applications
developers. Over time the base of computer owners who used Microsoft's
operating system software expanded, making it attractive for software
85 Evans & lansiti emphasize the importance of developing scalable platforms that achieve
prolitability quickly. See Evans & lansiti, supra note 15.
86 See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99
ECON. J. 116 (1989).
87 See Evans & lansiti, supra note 15, at 3-4.
88 Stanley Liebowitz states that:
A company that takes big losses this year in order to win the market share wars is
likely to find that it has won only a Pyrrhic victory. Businesses that still adhere to
this notion and invest enormous sums for early advantage are likely to fail in the
market. Much of the recent melt-down in high-tech sectors of the economy can be
blamed on these misguided ideas.
LIEBOWITZ, supra note 5 I, at 48.
89 See AJIT KAMBIL & ERIC VAN HECK, MAKING MARKETS: How FIRMS CAN DESIGN AND
PROFIT FROM ONLINE AUCTIONS AND EXCHANGES 103-27 (2002); see also John Frederick Moore,
Ebusiness Dispatch: What's Next for B2B?, BUSINESS 2.0, Sept. 18, 2001, at
http://www.business2.com/articles/web/0, 1653,17177,FF.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
Vol. 20:325, 2003
Multi-Sided Platform Markets
developers to use this operating system and for Microsoft to add features
they could use.90
E. Pricing Structures and Strategies
Many platform companies settle on pricing structures that are heavily
skewed towards one side of the market. Table I summarizes the pricing
structure for selected multi-sided platforms. For example, in 2001
American Express earned eighty-two percent of its revenues from
merchants, excluding finance charge revenue. 91 Microsoft earns the
substantial majority of its Windows revenue from licensing the operating
system to computer manufacturers or end users. 92 Shopping malls earn
virtually all their revenues from leasing space; not only do they not charge
for admittance, they sometimes offer free parking and other amenities.
Zero or negative prices also appear as suggested by the multi-sided
platform theory.93 The pure case involves platforms such as Adobe, which
gives away its reader software-for which it incurs some cost-to increase
the demand for its production software.94 Impure cases involve platforms
such as RealNetworks, which gives a basic version of its player away to
users but collects some revenues from individuals who want more features.
However, the fraction of users paying for the premium edition is small-
only 1.4 percent of the user base in 2000.95 Similarly, Apple gives away
the basic QuickTime Player while charging for the premium edition.96
90 See AL GILLEN, IDC, WORLDWIDE CLIENT AND SERVER OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS
FORECAST AND ANALYSIS, 2002-2006: MICROSOFT EXTENDS ITS GRIP ON THE MARKET (IDC 27969,
Sept. 2002); Michael J. Miller, Windows 98 Put to the Test, PC MAG., Aug. 1, 1998, at 100.
91 If finance charge revenues, net of interest expense, are included, American Express
earned sixty-two percent of its revenues from merchants in 2001. If gross finance charge revenues are
included, American Express earned fifty-five percent of its revenues from merchants in 2001. See
AMERICAN EXPRESS Co., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2002),
http://www.onlineproxy.com/amex/2002/ar/pdf/axpar_2001.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2002). While
finance charges are an important revenue stream, they represent a second service, that of credit
provision, separate from payment services.
92 From 1988 through 2000, Microsoft earned at least sixty-seven percent of its revenues
from licensing packaged software (such as Windows and Office) to end users, either directly at retail
or through manufacturer pre-installation on PCs. See IDC, 1994 WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE REVIEW AND
FORECAST (Nov. 1994); through IDC, WORLDWIDE SOFTWARE MARKET FORECAST SUMMARY, 2001 -
2005 (Sept. 2001), IDC 25569.
Note that the sixty-seven percent figure underestimates the amount of revenue Microsoft earns
from end users because the other third of revenue coming from "Applications Development and
Deployment" includes some end-user revenues as well. For example, database products used by
business IT departments are included in the Applications Development category.
93 Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien refer to the low or negative price strategy as "divide-
and-conquer." See CAILLAUD & JULLIEN, supra note 14, at I; see also JULLIEN, supra note 14, at l,
94 See Adobe, Acrobat Family, at http://www.adobe.com/products/acroba/readstep.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
95 Brian Quinton, Printing the Content Pump, TELEPHONY, Aug. 21, 2000, available at
http://currentissue.telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom_primingcontent-pump/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2003). RealNetworks earns the majority of its revenues through sales of servers, various authoring and
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Zero or negative prices are especially likely at the entry phase to get
critical mass on one side of the market. 97 Diners Club gave its charge card
away to cardholders at first; there was no annual fee, and users received
the benefit of the float.95 Netscape gave away its browser to most users to
get a critical mass on the computer user side of the market; after Microsoft
started giving away its browser to all users Netscape followed suit.99
Microsoft is reportedly subsidizing the sales of its X-box hardware to
consumers to get them on board.'00
Sometimes all the platforms converge on the same pricing strategy.
Microsoft, Apple, IBM, Palm, and other operating system companies
could have charged higher fees to applications developers and lower fees
to end users. They all discovered that it made sense to charge developers
relatively modest fees for developer kits and, especially in the case of
Microsoft, to give a lot away for free. Nevertheless, Microsoft is known
for putting far more effort into the developer side of the business than the
other operating system companies. °a To take another example, in the
battle between Microsoft and Netscape over Internet browsers, Microsoft
gave away developer kits to Internet portals, while Netscape charged for
them.'02
The debit card is an example in which different platforms made
different pricing choices because they had different customers on board
when they entered. In the late 1980s, ATM networks had a base of
cardholders who used their cards to withdraw cash or obtain other services
at ATMs. They had no merchants that took these cards. To add debit
services to existing ATM cards, ATM networks charged a smaller
interchange fee than did credit card systems to encourage merchants to
install PIN pads. Compared to credit card systems' interchange fee of 38
cents on a typical $30 transaction, ATM networks only charged 8 cents.
0 3
publishing tools, entertainment software other than RealPlayer, provision of support and maintenance
services, and sales of advertising. See REALNETWORKS, SEC FORM 10-K 20-24 (2001).
96 There are now 100,000,000 basic QuickTime Player users. Information on the number of
premium edition users is not available. See Apple, QuickTime Home Page, at
http://www.apple.com/quicktime/whyqt (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
97 Of course, such penetration pricing strategies are also common in one-sided markets. For
example, giving away samples may be an effective strategy to build business for the future. See. e.g.,
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 332-76.
98 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 62.
99 See Wylie Wong, Netscape Applauds Microsoft Suit, TECHWEB, May 20, 1998, at
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/msftdoj/TWB 19980519S0007 (last visited Aug. 21, 2002).
100 David Becker, Abox Drags on Microsoft Profit, CNET.COM, Jan. 18, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1040-818798.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2002).
101 See ANNABELLE GAWER & MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: How
INTEL, MICROSOFT, AND Cisco DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION 150-51 (2002).
102 Direct Testimony of Cameron Myhrvold, at 25-96, United States v. Microsoft Corp.
(D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/mswitness/
myhrvold/myhrvoldpt2.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
103 The ATM systems typically charged a flat interchange fee per transaction, while the
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(On debit and credit transactions, the interchange fee is paid by the
merchant's bank to the cardholder's bank. A lower interchange fee will
tend to lower prices on the merchant's side and to raise them on the
cardholder's side.) The PIN pads merchants installed could read the ATM
cards that cardholders already had and accept the PINs they used to access
ATMs. 10 4 In response to ATM networks' low interchange fee, many
merchants invested in the PIN pads, whose numbers increased from 53,000
in 1990 to about 3.6 million in 2001.' 05 In contrast to the credit card
systems, which already had a base of merchants who took their cards and
consumers who used them, ATM systems had to persuade banks to issue
debit cards and cardholders to take these cards. 10 6 Their strategy worked:
The number of Visa debit cards in circulation increased from 7.6 million in
1990 to about 117 million in 2001.'07
Two other factors besides market share appear to affect the pricing
structure of platform businesses. There may be certain customers on one
side of the market-Rochet and Tirole refer to them as "marquee
buyers"'° 8-that are extremely valuable to customers on the other side of
the market. The existence of marquee buyers tends to reduce the price to
all buyers and increase it to sellers. For example, American Express has
been able to charge a relatively high price to merchants as compared to
other card brands, because merchants viewed the American Express
business clientele as extremely attractive. Corporate expense clients were
"marquee" customers that allowed American Express to raise its prices to
the other side of the market, merchants.'0 9
A similar phenomenon occurs when certain customers are extremely
loyal to the platform business-perhaps because of long-term contracts or
sunk-cost investments. In the case of the ATM networks, however, card
issuers faced "captive" customers-ATM cards could be used as online
debit cards, so consumers did not need to be courted to accept the new
payment form. Therefore, it has been the merchants-who must purchase
and install expensive machinery in order to process online debit
transactions-who have been courted, as we saw above.
interchange fee set by Visa and MasterCard varied with the size of the transaction. The reported
interchange fee comparison is from 1998, around the time of substantial growth in debit for the ATM
and credit card systems. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 300.
104 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 300.
105 Id. at 308-09; PIN-based Shared & National POS Debit Card Systems, NILSON REP.,
Mar. 2002, at 6.
106 Visa attracted consumers through an effective advertising campaign and attracted issuers
through heavy investment in a debit processing facility, among other strategies. EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 297-319.
107 See Debit Cards, NILSON REP., Mar. 2002, at 7; Batik Debt Cards-U.S., NILSON REP.,
May 1991, at 6.
108 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 22.
109 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 184-85.
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Skewed pricing structures are not the only way to obtain critical mass.
Platforms sometimes invest in one side of the market to lower the costs of
participation for consumers on that side of the market. Microsoft provides
a good example of this. It invests in applications developers by developing
tools that help them write applications and providing other assistance that
makes it easier to write applications using Microsoft operating systems.' 10
To take another example, bond dealers take positions in their personal
accounts for certain bonds they trade. They do this when the bond is thinly
traded and the long time delays between buys and sells would hinder the
market's pricing and/or liquidity. By investing in this manner, multi-sided
intermediaries are able to cultivate (or even initially supply) one side, or
many sides, of their market in order to boost the overall success of the
platform. Another effect of providing benefits to one side is that this
assistance can discourage use of competing platform firms. For example,
when Palm provides free tools and support to PDA applications software
developers, it encourages those developers to write programs that work on
the Palm OS platform, but it also induces those developers to spend less
time writing programs for other operating systems."'
F. Multi-Sided Markets and Social Welfare
In practice, a relatively small number of firms tend to compete in
multi-sided platform markets because of indirect network effects on the
demand side and fixed costs of establishing platforms. The benefits of
demand and cost-side scale economies are often limited, however, by the
existence of heterogeneous customers on one side of the market. As a
result, we see few firms in each market, but also few monopolies.
The consequences of having relatively few competitors in multi-sided
markets, and the existence of network effects, raise familiar issues
concerning the efficacy of competitive markets and the possibility of a role
for government intervention. However, the pricing and investment
strategies that firms in multi-sided markets use to "get all sides on board"
and "balance the interests of all sides" raise novel issues. One issue is
whether the relative prices adopted by multi-sided firms-which in
practice often result in one side seemingly subsidizing the other side-are
socially inefficient.
In an admittedly simplified setting, Rochet and Tirole analyze the
pricing structure-relative prices as opposed to absolute prices-adopted
by firms in two-sided markets as compared to the pricing structure that
would maximize social welfare. They find that a firm with a monopoly, a
110 See Microsoft, Developer Tools and Information for Developers, at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/vstudio/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
Ill See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 4.
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firm with competition, and a benevolent social planner would all adopt
similar pricing structures. The precise relative prices would differ
somewhat." 2 However, Rochet and Tirole find that the relative prices
chosen by a monopoly and competing platforms are not biased toward one
side or the other compared to the pricing structure a benevolent social
planner would adopt. 13 (Schmalensee finds similar results for interchange
fees." 4) There is no reason to believe that charging one side of the market
relatively low prices and the other side relatively high prices is inefficient
in and of itself.
Nevertheless, firms in concentrated multi-sided markets have the
same opportunities as firms in concentrated single-sided markets to
establish price levels that permit them to earn supra-competitive profits-
i.e., profits that exceed those necessary to attract capital to the industry
after accounting for risk. In multi-sided markets as in single-sided markets,
however, the relevant measure is ex ante rather than ex post profits: Did
the business have risk-adjusted expected profits that exceeded competitive
levels upon entry? One day Amazon.corn and eBay may be extremely
profitable companies. If that day comes one should ignore neither the
losses they incurred nor the risk they faced in getting to that point; the risk
is reflected in the multitude of failures by other companies that attempted
to create similar platforms, failed, and caused massive financial losses for
their investors.' 15
II. Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Markets
The economics of multi-sided markets differs from the economics of
single-sided markets in important respects. First, the individual prices
charged on each side of the market do not track costs or demand on that
side of the market. The fact that benefits and costs arise jointly in multiple
sides of the market implies that there is no meaningful economic
relationship between benefits and costs on each side of the market
considered alone. Second, one cannot talk about the individual prices in
isolation. Any change in demand or cost on one side of the market will
necessarily affect the level and relationship of prices on all sides. Third,
products in multi-sided markets may not be able to come into existence
unless firms in those markets get all sides on board. This gives rise to
pricing and investment strategies that differ from those taken in one-sided
112 In the special case of linear demand the pricing structures would be identical. Id. at 35-
36.
113 Id. at 25.
114 See Schmalensee, supra note 14, at 118-20.
115 Josh Lemer, Risk and the New Economy, THE MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW, Third Quarter
2002, at 24.
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markets and seem odd unless considered in the context of multi-sided
market competition. Fourth, any analysis of social welfare must account
for the pricing level, the pricing structure, and the feasible alternatives for
getting all sides on board. It must also account for the possible role of not-
for-profit institutions such as standards setting bodies and cooperatives.
These differences matter for antitrust analysis. Considering them will
avoid the error of condemning procompetitive behavior. It is important to
emphasize that multi-sided platform markets are no more or less
susceptible to anti-competitive conduct than are single-sided markets.
There are, however, opportunities for different kinds of anti-competitive
conduct in multi-sided platform markets than in others. For example firms
can engage in tactics on one side-such as exclusive contracts-that could
increase their market power on all sides. There are also markets where the
economics of platform businesses suggests that certain practices that may
appear anti-competitive-recouping losses from "low prices" on one side
through "high prices" on the other side-are natural, pro-competitive
practices. Market definition, to which we now turn, is another important
area where the economics of multi-sided markets change the standard
analysis. One needs to take the multi-sided nature of platform businesses
into account to determine market boundaries, but doing so does not have
any uniform effect on whether a merger in a platform business should be
considered pro-competitive or anti-competitive.
A. Market Definition and the Evaluation of Market Power
1. Market Definition
The general purpose of market definition is to provide a context for
examining the issues that arise in an antitrust matter.' 16 For cases involving
alleged anti-competitive conduct, market definition helps to determine
whether the defendant has enough market power to engage in certain anti-
competitive tactics and whether those tactics will result in an increase in or
maintenance of its market power. For merger cases, market definition
helps to identify the firms that could constrain possible price increases by
the merging parties and thereby helps to determine whether the merging
parties will realize a significant increase in their market power. Often,
market definition determines whether a firm's product is in the market or
out of the market by looking at substitution in demand or supply.' 17 The
degree of competitiveness of the market is then assessed by calculating the
distribution of market shares that participants hold, the Herfindhal-
116 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 125 (1976); see
also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 611-12.
117 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 612-15.
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Hirschman Index ("HHI") being a commonly used measure."1 8 A firm's
market share is often taken as a proxy for its market power.
The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission,
along with several economists, take a standard, mechanical approach to
determining whether a firm is in the market." 19 They start with the firm(s)
under consideration and add competitors to the market. The market
boundary results (in a geographic or product dimension) when the
collection of firms could, acting as a monopolist, raise price by a small but
significant non-transitory amount (often taken to be five to ten percent). If
the collection of firms could do so, then presumably the firms "outside of
the market" do not substantially constrain the firms "inside the market".
Although primarily developed as a screening device for clearing
inconsequential mergers,20 economists and lawyers sometimes advocate
using this approach to market definition in conduct cases as well.'
This approach, however, must be used with special care when multi-
sided platforms are involved. The pricing analysis must consider all sides
of the market and their interactions. This is apparent from looking at the
equilibrium conditions for determining pricing levels and pricing
structures in multi-sided platform markets (see, for example, Equations 2,
4 and 5 above). The Justice Department's approach in United States v.
Visa U.S.A. 12 2 illustrates the problem. MasterCard and Visa service
cardholders and merchants. The DOJ's economic expert asked whether a
hypothetical merger of all credit and charge card issuers could profitably
raise prices to cardholders, looking only at profits on the issuer/cardholder
side. 12  This analysis failed to consider two factors. First, any decrease in
cardholder volume would lead to a decrease in merchant volume. Second,
if merchant volume decreases, then any profits on the merchant side would
118 Id.
119 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Ep. (CCH) 113,104 (Apr. 8, 1997); see
also Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777 (1989); Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, 1982 Merger Guidelines. The 1982 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines: An Economic Assessment. 71 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1983); Gregory J. Werden, Market
Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514; Gregory J.
Werden, The History ofAntitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 190 (1992).
120 Debra A. Valentine, Federal Trade Commission, The Evolution of U.S. Merger Law,
Address at the INDECOPI Conference, Federal Trade Commission, Aug. 13, 1998, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvperumerg.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
121 For instance, the five-percent test was used to establish the relevant market in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., 523 U.S. 1094
(1998). See Mark Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market Power: Kodak in
Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REv. 185, 215-24 (1994). For recent non-merger cases, see United States v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Direct Testimony of Frederick R.
Warren-Boulton on behalf of the United States, at 26-32, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C.
1999) (No. 98-1233) (hereinafter Warren-Boulton Testimony].
122 See Visa U.S.A., Inc, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322.
123 Id. at 336.
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also decrease, leading to a decrease in merchant demand for the system
(which could then lead to a decrease in cardholder demand, and so on).
The DOJ's economist did not consider effects on profits on the merchant
side. Changes in cardholder volume would affect profits on both the
issuing and acquiring sides. By focusing only on the cardholder side, the
analysis put forward by the government's economist neglected at least half
of the story. The importance of the interaction between the two sides is, of
course, an empirical question.
2 4
This kind of mistake is easy to make. One tends to think of the
services being supplied to merchants as different than the services supplied
to cardholders and therefore categorize the services as being in different
markets. It is natural, although wrong, to ignore the coupling. The error of
treating multi-sided markets in isolation from one another is even easier
when the other market is one in which the "product" is priced at zero or is
given away, because in that case one does not think of firms as competing
for sales. Thus, it is easy to think of shopping malls as renting space to
retailers (ignoring the market for shoppers), Adobe as selling document
production software (ignoring the market for readers), Palm as selling
software and hardware systems for personal data management (ignoring
the market for applications), and television stations as selling advertising
(ignoring the market for providing content to viewers). In all these cases,
the pricing and production decisions are inextricably intertwined.
There may be cases where the crossover effects are small enough that
a single side constitutes a market under the merger guidelines test
described above. That, however, demonstrates a weakness in the merger
guidelines approach, since an understanding of multi-sided markets is
necessary to identify anti-competitive conduct even if the crossover effects
are small. Suppose a correct application of the merger guidelines approach
finds that a single side of a multi-sided market is a relevant antitrust
market. In practice, that will tend to lead the court to view market power
and anti-competitive conduct within the four corners of that market. The
court will tend to get the economics wrong, since the principles that
explain pricing and other business behavior in a multi-sided market are
fundamentally different than in a single-sided market.
124 A full discussion of the appropriate use of market definition and market power in antitrust
is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted, however, that the DOJ's economic expert failed
to consider whether any market power that existed could have been used to harm consumers in the
form of limiting American Express's ability to compete. In particular, because Visa and MasterCard
operate on a not-for-profit basis, setting member fees to cover costs, any market power would not be
used to raise prices, which is the typical antitrust concern. See HOWARD H. CHANG ET AL., HAS THE
CONSUMER HARM STANDARD LOST ITS TEETH? 29-41 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Related Publication, August 2002), http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/





Market share as a proxy for market power is problematic in many
circumstances but is especially so for businesses that compete in multi-
sided platform markets.1 25  Economists have shown that Coumot-
competition or differentiated-market Bertrand competition among firms in
single-sided markets implies that the equilibrium prices will depend on
some function of market shares.1 26 Those models do not apply when
looking at just one side of multi-sided platform businesses. Pricing power
on each side depends on the degree of competition on both sides. For
example, in Rochet and Tirole's model, multihoming on one side of the
market "intensifies price competition" on the other side of the market.'
27
Consider also the video game industry. The pricing power of a video game
console maker depends on its share of game developer efforts as well as its
share of console sales.
More sophisticated analyses do not rely on market share as a proxy
but instead seek to determine directly whether the firm under consideration
prices above marginal cost by a significant amount. As seen earlier,
however, there is no necessary relationship between price and marginal
cost on any side of multi-sided platform markets. In fact, the price on one
side of the market could be well above marginal cost, while the price on
the other side of the market could be below marginal cost. To analyze
market power from this perspective, one has to examine whether the total
price is significantly above total marginal costs.
In markets in which there are significant fixed costs-the case in
most, if not all, platform markets-one needs to be careful about inferring
too much competitive significance even from the fact that firms' prices
exceed marginal costs. If the purpose of the market power inquiry is to
assess the state of competition in the industry, it makes more economic
sense, in theory, to look at the risk-adjusted rate of return on investment. 128
For multi-sided platform markets, that analysis should consider the total
125 Economists have criticized for a long time the use of market share as a proxy for market
power. See FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
AND U.S. vs. IBM 99-100 (1983); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942); Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1810-13 (1990).
126 See Robert D. Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger
Guidelines, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 199, 281 (Bailey &
Winston eds., 1991); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990).
127 See Rochet & Tirole, Platforn, supra note 14, at 5.
128 Unfortunately, in practice it is extremely difficult to determine whether a firm or an
industry-one-sided or two-sided---eams a supra-competitive, risk-adjusted rate of return. What is
difficult is measuring expost the expected return ex ante. Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On
the Misuse ofAccounting Rates of Return To Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (1983).
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returns and the total investment in all sides.'2 9 For example, eBay has
made significant investments in developing buyer communities even
though it realizes most of its revenues from sellers. 3° It likely charges
sellers more than the marginal cost of serving them. 3' Alternatively, one
could assess the degree of market power by determining the extent to
which incumbents are constrained in their pricing and innovation behavior
by the prospect of entry. That involves assessing the extent to which there
are barriers to entry by equal or more efficient rivals-a topic I consider
separately below. 32 Even markets that appear to be dominated by a single
player may be contestable. Jullien's model "suggests that it may be easier
than expected for a superior technology to enter, provided that the quality
improvement is large enough."'133 Because many of the multi-sided
markets are fast moving, current leaders often face competition in the form
of potential entrants-other platforms striving to displace today's leader.
Caillaud and Jullien argue that the Internet represents one such
environment:
Too many ways of stealing the competitors' business appear.
Unsurprisingly, the strategic situation is very unstable and the only
equilibrium situation that is tenable is for a firm to exert dominance on
the intermediation market, i.e., to be the sole supplier of intermediation
services, without enjoying any market power as potential entrants create
a strong disciplinary device for the dominant firm. In some sense, this
market is extremely contestable. 134
In merger inquiries, market power is the central inquiry: Would the
merging parties have the power to increase price significantly? For
mergers that involve platforms, it is not possible to answer that question
without considering the combined and interrelated effects on all customer
groups served by the platform. The merger of two platforms will affect
their price levels and price structures. Depending on their cost and demand
structures and the state of competition, the equilibrium post-merger prices
129 See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust
Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY I
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) (Market definition and market power are particularly complex in new-
economy industries).
130 See EBAY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 7-8, 24 (2002); see also Evans & lansiti, supra note
15.
131 Comparing price and marginal cost is problematic in dynamically competitive markets,
since one would expect the dynamic competitive equilibrium to consist of surviving firms with price
higher than marginal cost. Such an ex-post premium is necessary to induce firms to enter in dynamic
competition in which many of them will fail. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 129, at 141.
132 See United States v. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
133 See JULLIEN, supra note 14, at 34.
134 See CAILLAUD & JULLIEN, supra note 14, at 39. The authors are speaking of Interet
intermediaries, but the point holds for other fast-moving dynamic markets.
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could result in prices changing disproportionately and could conceivably
result in one price falling."3 5 There is an additional point the merger
inquiry would need to consider. Mergers that increase the customer base
on one side increase the value on the other side(s). Therefore, consumer
welfare may increase even though prices increase on one side or in total. 36
Consider the following hypothetical merger. There are two chains of
dating clubs in Boston-AAA Mates and Best Match (clubs A and B,
respectively). They cater to somewhat different clienteles. Club A charges
men $20 for admission and women $0; Club B charges men $30 for
admission and gives women a $5 credit (in the form of free drinks). Club B
has been more successful because it attracts more women and as a result of
that it attracts more men. In fact, it is so successful that-like an "in"
discotheque-it typically has a line and can select the men and women to
admit. It tries to weed out "undesirable" men and women. Assume that
dating clubs in Boston is the relevant market. Club A has a twenty percent
share of admissions and B a forty percent share. Will the merger raise
prices? One cannot answer that question by looking just at the demand for
patrons overall-e.g., by estimating the demand for admission against the
average price. The mix of men and women is critically important. One
would have to estimate the demand for men and the demand for women
simultaneously. Then, using the theory of pricing in two-sided markets
considered earlier together with information on cost, one could predict
whether the merger would lead the combined firms to increase their total
price. 137
Let us suppose that the analysis shows that the merged club would
charge $32 for men and give women a credit of $6 at both locations.
Assuming equal numbers of men and women, the average price charged at
Club A would rise from $10 to $13, and the average price charged at Club
B would rise from $12.50 to $13. It is unclear whether dating customers
are better or worse off. On average the customers pay more. But in the
aggregate they could get more as well: The men may have a better
135 For example, in the Rochet-Tirole model multihoming will, all else equal, lead to
relatively lower prices on the other side of the market and relatively higher prices on the side with
multihoming. See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 29. For example, if there are two game
console platforms and most developers write games for both platforms, prices to console purchasers
will be relatively lower because they could choose either platform and still get access to most games,
while prices to game developers will be relatively higher. With a merger of the two game console
platforms, although overall prices might increase, prices for game developers will decrease relative to
prices for console purchasers and may decrease absolutely if the elimination of multihoming has a
significantly strong effect.
136 Merger analysis in one-sided markets faces similar problems. Sometimes mergers permit
the parties to create new products. The value of these new products should be considered as part of the
efficiency analysis. See David S. Evans et al., Demand-side Efficiencies in Merger Analysis, 26
WORLD COMPETITION (forthcoming Summer 2003) at 10-14.
137 For an empirical application along these lines, see RYSMAN, supra note 33.
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selection of women to choose from and the women may have a better
selection of men to choose from.
3. Barriers to Entry
Barriers to entry merit separate treatment because they are important
to the analysis of both market definition and market power. In market
definition, barriers to entry are relevant for assessing whether firms can
come into the market and thereby constrain price increases of incumbent
firms. In measuring market power, barriers to entry may determine
whether the firm in question 138 can exclude competitors and thereby
maintain prices that exceed some competitive norm. This is of particular
concern in monopoly maintenance cases where a preliminary issue is
whether the defendant has monopoly power. According to du Pont, a firm
has monopoly power if it has the power to "control prices or exclude
competition."'' 39 The definition of barriers to entry is a controversial topic,
much debated among antitrust scholars. Some take the position that
anything that makes it "hard" to get into a market should be considered a
barrier, 140 while others prefer to restrict use of the term to advantages that
an incumbent firm has that an entrant cannot secure.
14 1
Multi-sided platform markets are usually "hard" to get into in the
sense sometimes used in antitrust analyses: Getting into these markets is
138 This could involve the proposed combination of firms in a merger inquiry.
139 El. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391.
140 "An entry barrier is any factor that permits firms already in the market to cam returns
above the competitive level while deterring outsiders from entering." 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 56-57 (2002)
(footnote omitted). This definition follows J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR
CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 11-19 (1956). For a list of court
cases relying on this definition of entry barriers, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., supra, at 123-24.
In practice, the condition that the factor must result in the ability of the firm "to earn returns
above the competitive level" is dropped in one of two ways. First, the condition is just ignored. The
correct economic concept is whether the expected rate of return to the firm based on the information
available to the market at the time it made the investment exceeds the competitive level after adjusting
for risk. See Fisher & McGowan, supra note 128, at 90-91. It is almost impossible to measure this ex
ante return with ex post information. Second, the competitive rates of return are calculated from ex
post data with no adjustment for the risk perceived ex ante. For example, it is common for analysts to
calculate the returns based on survivors in an industry without adjusting for the losses incurred by
failures. The result is that firms in industries involving substantial investments in research and
development or other fixed costs are identified, incorrectly, as earning a supra-competitive return. See
id. at 91; FISHER ET AL., supra note 125, at 119-69. Not surprisingly, Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow
identify almost any advantage of incumbency as a barrier to entry. They include "economies of scale,
high initial investment, capital market imperfections, risk, low prices, scarce inputs or customers,
product reputation and promotion, and government constraints" as barriers to entry. 2A AREEDA ET
AL., supra, at 65.
141 See GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-69 (1983); see also
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 76-77. Unlike the Bain definition one does not need to inquire
into whether the "barrier" gives rise to a supra-competitive rate of return. One only has to ask whether
the alleged barrier is something that entrants could obtain at the same cost as the incumbent.
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hard just as climbing stairs is hard, but entering is not hard in the same
sense as gaining membership to the Augusta National Golf Club is hard. 4 '
Entrants may require large sums of capital. 43 That appears less true during
the fairly lengthy childhoods of some platform industries; Marco lansiti
and I have found that many successful platforms start out small and
expand over time.' 44 Multi-sided platform markets are also hard to get into
because firms must solve quite complex business problems. That
complexity may, however, give subsequent entrants an advantage; they
can \look to the pricing structures and business models adopted by
successful incumbents. When American Express entered the charge card
business in 1958, for example, it could observe the success of the pricing
structure that Diners Club had adopted when it entered in 1950. When
Palm entered the operating system business for handheld devices, it could
observe the success of Microsoft's business model of both developing
applications internally as well as assisting independent developers to write
applications. Lastly, building up critical mass on multiple market sides is
hard. Of course, as in any market in which there are substantial scale
economies in demand or supply, there is no guarantee that entry is
sufficient to prevent incumbent firms from realizing risk-adjusted returns
that exceed the competitive level.
The need to develop two or more sides of the market raises a potential
competitive problem that does not exist in one-sided markets. A
coordination problem is possible: Consumers on one side are reluctant to
switch unless they expect that some consumers on the other side(s) will
also switch. In a one-sided market, a consumer need only be concerned
about its own decision to switch, not what other consumers will choose. In
many ways, the coordination issue in multi-sided markets is analogous to
the question of whether network industries exhibit lock-in effects-where
consumers may be reluctant to switch to a new network and lose the
benefits of network externalities unless others also switch. 45 And similar
analyses are necessary to determine whether the theoretical possibility of a
coordination problem is, for any particular industry, a significant one for
antitrust analysis.
First, we must consider whether coordination is a big or a small
problem. For example, as Microsoft entered the handheld computing
industry with its PocketPC platform facing Palm, a successful incumbent,
142 Women are never admitted, and many wealthy and influential golfers have not gotten the
nod. Jeffrey Gettleman, In a Town Tied to a Golf Club, Tradition Trumps All That Gets in Its Way,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at 15.
143 Of course, with well-developed capital markets it is difficult to see why raising capital
should be considered a barrier. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 9-12 (2000).
144 See Evans & lansiti, supra note 15.
145 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 50, at 36-40.
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it had to convince developers to write for its new platform. While writing
for the more established platform might seem preferable, developers may
also be willing to transfer (or "port") existing programs to a new platform,
which might be cheaper given the initial development of the program for
Palm. Moreover, even if developers are willing to write for only one
platform, a new platform offers developers a choice of less competition on
a smaller platform (at least initially) versus more competition on the
established, larger platform. At least some developers are likely to take a
bigger piece of a smaller pie.
Second, even if coordination is a non-trivial concern, competition is
still likely to occur. In the extreme, suppose that coordination problems
mean that only one platform will be successful at any given time. There is
still likely to be competition "for the market," rather than "in the
market."' 146 While there may be initial losses from entering multiple sides
of the market, the potential gains from becoming the one successful
platform can provide substantial incentives for firms to enter and attempt
to displace the incumbent. If consumers on many sides congregate to one
platform, they may also congregate to a new platform that offers
something better. An incumbent platform can find itself displaced quickly
if it does not continue to offer all its consumers a better deal than potential
entrants. (This is analogous to the situation in network industries where
consumers could "tip" to an entrant much as they might tip to the
incumbent network.)
Third, it is important to note that coordination is not an issue in multi-
sided platform markets where multihoming is possible or common on at
least one side of the market. For example, because many video game
developers are willing to write for multiple platforms, potential end users
of a new video game platform can expect that there will be games for it as
long as the platform is sound. When multihoming is possible or common
on all sides, coordination cannot be an issue at all. For instance, both
cardholders and merchants typically belong to multiple card systems. Both
potential cardholders and merchants of a new card system can expect that
consumers on the other side will join as long as the system is attractive.
The card system must still develop both sides, and that may or may not be
a difficult business problem. But these are, in general, problems that all
firms have to face, whether they enter early or late. Firms have to develop
critical mass on all significant sides of the market. Sometimes this
development requires significant investments, including foregone revenues
from lower prices. However, there is no reason why this development
should necessarily cost entrants more than it cost incumbents.
146 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 509 U.S. 209
(1993); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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Historically, the need to build up critical mass on multiple sides in
many instances has not deterred entry. In the case of payment cards, for
example, there was successive entry by Diners Club (1950), American
Express (1958), Visa (1966), MasterCard (1966), and Discover (1985).
147
In the case of video games in the US, there was successive entry by
Magnavox (1972), Atari (1975), Coleco (1976), Fairchild (1976), Mattel
(1979), Nintendo (1985), Sega (1989), Sony (1995), and Microsoft
(200 1).148 Of course, in any particular platform market, switching costs or
some other transaction cost may prevent a more efficient competitor from
building critical mass.
The existence of significant entry barriers was a key issue in the
analysis of market power in United States v. Microsoft-a case that
involved software platforms. 149 The government and Microsoft agreed
there were tens of thousands of software applications that ran on Windows.
The government viewed these as a strategic asset that deterred entry into
the market for operating systems. It termed this asset the "applications
barrier to entry."' 150 While this is not the place to treat fully whether the
stock of applications was a barrier to entry in the senses discussed above,
the economics of multi-sided markets does provide some notable insights.
Firms in multi-sided businesses routinely invest in developing customer
bases that provide value to other customers. Every firm selling a platform,
from Diners Club in 1950 to eBay in 1995, has done this.' 5' Many times
one customer base is served at a low price, such as the developer
community writing programs for Windows and other software platform
vendors. This investment is pro-competitive; it makes the platform product
more valuable for all customer communities. The fact that a dating club
has a queue of appealing men, that American Express has premier
147 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 173.
148 See STEVEN L. KENT, THE ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES, at xi-xvi (2001).
149 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Microsoft IIl); see
also David S. Evans et al., An Analysis of the Government's Economnic Case in U.S. v. Microsoft, 46
ANTITRUST BULL. 163 (2001); TIMOTHY F. BRESNAHAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE MICROSOFT CASE
12 (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 232, Mar.
2002).
150 Warren-Boulton Testimony, supra note 121, 54 (This phenomenon...creates what is
best termed the "applications barrier to entry." Simply put, an operating system product can rise to
dominate the market, and once that dominance is achieved maintain it, because of both the large
number of complementary software applications available for it and the flow of new applications that
are written to it."); see also Direct Testimony of Franklin M. Fisher on behalf of the United States,
14, 70, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1233) [hereinafter Fisher Testimony]
("As the result of economies of scale and network effects, Microsoft's high market share leads to more
applications being written for its operating system, which reinforces and increases Microsoft's market
share, which in turn leads to still more applications being written for Windows than for other operating
systems, and so on.").
151 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 61-84; EBAY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2,
7-8 (2002). For a more complete discussion of the strategies used by successful multi-sided firms see
Evans & lansiti, supra note 15.
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merchants, or that the Sony PlayStation has cool games does not by itself
imply that the incumbent has an advantage an entrant could not also
secure.
It seems intuitive to argue, as the government did in Microsoft, that
there is a coordination problem: The positive feedback effects between the
two sides and the fact that a firm must succeed on both sides make entry
difficult. However, this holds true in all multi-sided platform markets.
Coordination must be shown to be a serious problem in practice, not just a
theoretical possibility. Given the extent to which sequential-and often
displacing-entry has taken place in these markets, the existence of the
"chicken and egg" theoretical conundrum15 does not appear empirically to
be a prohibitive barrier to aspiring platform entrants.
The economics of multi-sided platform markets provides some insight
into how one might analyze the applications barrier to entry issue for
software platforms. Consider two software platform companies. Entrant 1
comes in before Entrant 2. To get both sides on board, Entrant I has to
spend $1 billion to get developers to write applications. If Entrant 2 had to
spend $1.1 billion to get both sides on board, we would probably conclude
that the entry barrier is fairly modest relative to the risk-adjusted profits
that could be earned in this business. If Entrant 2 had to spend $2 billion,
we might reach the opposite conclusion. In both cases we would consider
these entry barriers relative to prospective profits. For example, shortly
after Microsoft introduced Windows 2.0, IBM completed OS/2.1
53
However, due to its high price and incompatibility with other existing
applications, OS/2 was deemed a failure.154 The relevant question for
assessing whether the stock of applications was an entry barrier is whether
IBM could have succeeded had it made the same investment as Microsoft
in getting both sides of the market on board, with an equal or superior
operating system. Neither side in United States v. Microsoft addressed that
question.
B. Predatory Strategies Under the Rule of Reason
Businesses engage in various price and non-price strategies to
increase their sales and to decrease their competitors' sales. Courts
152 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
153 The first version of OS/2 was released in December 1987, seven months after the release
of Windows 2.0. See Michael Necasel, OS/2 Timeline 1987-1997, at
http://pages.prodigy.net/michaln/history/timeline.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); see also
Thecyberprice.com, Windows Timeline, at http://www.geocities.com/thecybeprice/wintimeline.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
154 See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not Only Microsoft: The Maturing of the Personal
Computer Software Industry, 1982-1995, 75 BuS. HIST. REv. 103, 127 (2001). See also Microsoft III,




evaluate these strategies under the rule of reason to determine whether, on
balance, they harm consumers and competition.
1. Predatory Pricing
The recognition that business strategies and their effects on
consumers must be evaluated with respect to multiple sides of the market
has implications for the analysis of predation. It may be privately and
socially optimal for prices on one side of the market to be below any
possible measure of cost on that side. That is true not only during the
initial stage in which economists and courts have recognized the virtues of
"penetration pricing,"' 55 but also during the long-run equilibrium of the
industry. It also may be privately and socially optimal for firms to make
significant investments in one side even though these investments do not
appear to generate profits on that side. Again, this can occur even when the
firm is mature.
The analyst can mistake competitive for predatory prices when
looking at only one side of a multi-sided market. In Figure 1, Panel C
shows an equilibrium with a negative price on one side, and Panel B shows
an example with a "low price" on one side that could be lower than some
measure of variable cost on that side. Either price might be deemed
predatory when looked at from a one-dimensional perspective. That is not
to say that multi-sided platform businesses do not engage in predatory
pricing as defined by courts. Before making that determination, though,
one needs to take all sides of the market into account.
To clarify the issues, let us consider extending the Brooke Group test
of predatory pricing to multi-sided markets. 156 That test has two prongs:
(1) Are the defendant's prices below cost? (2) Did the defendant have a
reasonable prospect of recouping predatory losses?
Under the first prong, the plaintiff alleging predation must show that
the defendant's prices were "below an appropriate measure of ...
costs."' 57 In multi-sided markets, one needs to compare the combined price
charged to all sides to the combined costs incurred for all sides. That is
straightforward in matchmaking markets. One can look at the total price
incurred by both sides (men and women, buyers and sellers, cardholders
and merchants) for a transaction and compare that total price to the
incremental cost of providing that transaction to both sides.
Consider the American Express corporate charge card. The
cardholder pays nothing for a transaction and often receives various
inducements that make the effective price of a transaction negative. The
155 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 146.
156 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 509 U.S. 209,222-24 (1993).
157 Id. at 222.
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merchant pays about 2.7 percent of the transaction price to American
Express.'5 8 For each transaction, American Express incurs costs for
authorizing and settling the transaction with the merchant, billing the
cardholder, incurring some risk of fraud or non-payment, awarding airline
reward miles to the cardholder, and other expenses. With discovery from
American Express, it may be relatively straightforward to calculate the
total price as a percent of a typical transaction and the incremental cost for
that transaction.' 59 That comparison is relevant for the price prong of the
Brooke Group test. The fact that cardholders pay a negative price is not
relevant; it is a consequence, and quite possibly a socially efficient one, of
pricing in a multi-sided market.
Comparing price and cost is a harder task in multi-sided markets that
do not involve matchmaking. The problem is that there is no natural unit of
account for combining and comparing prices and costs. Consider Adobe-
it gives its reader away, so that price is zero. It charges $249 per license
for its production software-Adobe Acrobat. 60 There is no economically
meaningful way to combine those two prices. Adobe incurs a fixed cost for
producing the reader and writer software. It incurs a small per copy cost
for distributing the reader software and a more substantial one for
distributing the writer software.' 61 But with no common unit of account
there is no way to add these costs up. So one cannot compare total price
with total incremental cost as we did in the matchmaker situation. One
could compare the total revenues received from the multiple sides of a
non-matchmaking market with the total variable costs incurred for
providing the multiple products-e.g., the total revenues- from Adobe
readers and writers versus the total variable costs of these software
packages. This would identify extreme forms of predation but would not
identify all situations in which incremental costs are less than incremental
revenue.
Under the second prong of the test, the "plaintiff must show that the
defendant had "a reasonable prospect, or, under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost
prices. ,1 62 For multi-sided markets, the court needs to consider whether
158 See AMERICAN EXPRESS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2002).
159 Of course, we know from the profitability of American Express that the total price per
transaction exceeds the total incremental cost per transaction. Id. at 35.
160 See Adobe, Adobe Store: Adobe Acrobat, at http://www.adobe.com/store/products/
master.jhtml?id=catAcrobat&sourcecode=106501 (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). Various license packages
are available at discount prices.
161 Data on distribution costs on each side are not available. Overall, for all Adobe products,
sales and marketing expenses accounted for fifty-two percent of total operating expenses and thirty-
three percent of total revenues in 2001. Sales and marketing expenses include costs incurred by sales,
marketing, customer support, and distribution personnel. See ADOBE SYSTEMS INC., SEC FORM 10-K
27, 61 (2002).
162 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
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there is a dangerous probability that the defendant will raise its total price
high enough and for long enough to recoup its losses during the alleged
predatory phase. There is nothing novel about implementing this prong for
multi-sided markets other than accounting for the multiple sides. This
analysis suggests that one needs to look at recoupment possibilities
throughout the multi-sided market and not just for the product whose low
prices initially attracted suspicion.
United States v. Microsoft provides an interesting example of
predation claims in multi-sided platform markets. The case mainly
involved competition between Microsoft's Internet Explorer ("IE") and
Netscape's Navigator browsers. 163 Both Microsoft and Netscape competed
in multi-sided markets. Microsoft created IE in part to enable Windows to
provide services to software developers writing Internet-related
applications and to end users who wanted to use the Internet. 64 It included
IE in Windows and provided IE for free to users of non-Microsoft software
platforms. 65 It also gave away a software tool that made it easier for
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and corporate IT departments to
customize Internet Explorer. 166 Netscape provided Navigator for free to
most users. Although its business model varied over time, it expected to
earn profits from customer groups that would value a base of Navigator
users. 167 For example, customers of Netscape's server software would
value this software more if there were more users of Netscape's web
browsing software. Advertisers would value Netscape's portal more if
there were Navigator browser users who came there by default. And
Netscape considered-how seriously is in dispute-developing Navigator
into a platform for applications.1
68
The government claimed Microsoft was engaging in predatory pricing
by giving IE away (indeed, offering IE at a negative price since Microsoft
gave inducements for people to take it) and by giving away its toolkit.
69
Like Microsoft, Navigator had a toolkit for ISPs and corporate users.
Initially Netscape sold the kit for $1,995 but subsequently gave it away. 70
This is not the place to address whether Microsoft's strategy was
predatory-that would require the analysis described above. However,
from the standpoint of multi-sided platform competition there is nothing
163 United States v. Microsoft Corp.,65 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).
164 Direct Testimony of Professor Richard Schmalensee on behalf of Microsoft Corp., at
206-253, United States v. Microsoft Corp. (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1233).
165 Id.
166 Microsoft I1, 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
167 See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO & DAVID B. YOFFIE, COMPETING ON INTERNET TIME,
LESSONS FROM NETSCAPE AND ITS BATTLE WITH MICROSOFT 97-100 (2000).
168 See Fisher Testimony, supra note 150, IMI 85-86.
169 See Fisher Testimony, supra note 150, 91-139.
170 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
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obviously unusual about either Microsoft's or Netscape's pricing
strategies.' 7' They both operated multi-sided platforms. They competed for
one customer group (browser users) to attract other customer groups
(although the two company's second sides were different). The
government claimed that Microsoft invested in a no-revenue product, IE,
to maintain the applications barrier to entry. 172 In the language of multi-
sided platform markets, the government's claim translates into the
observation that Microsoft invested in a no-revenue product to deliver one
customer group (applications developers) valued by another customer
group (end users). Microsoft's strategy-and Netscape's similar
behavior-is common in multi-sided platform markets.
173
2. Market Foreclosure Strategies
Exclusive contracts and product tying can be used to foreclose
competitors from a market and thereby help the firm that uses these
strategies to maintain or obtain a monopoly. This is a controversial and
unsettled area of antitrust law, and this Article will not address all its
facets. 174 Here I focus on how platform competition in multi-sided markets
affects the analysis of market foreclosure strategies. With platform
competition, one needs to consider how action on one side of the market
affects the other sides of the market, and what competitive effects
foreclosing behavior has. Successfully foreclosing a competitor on one
side of a market could prevent that firm from succeeding on the other side
and thereby deter platform entry. This is consistent with several post-
Chicago analyses of tying, which argue that a firm may attempt to force
171 A related point concerns the fact that competition in these markets was "winner-take-all"
because of substantial network effects. It is empirically difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
predatory from competitive pricing strategies in these circumstances. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra
note 50; see also Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry
in Network Markets (Aug. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal on Regulation).
172 See Fisher Testimony, supra note 150, IN 82, 92, 142.
173 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's predation claim here,
although mainly because of its general skepticism about low prices being anti-competitive.
The rare case of price predation aside, the antitrust laws do not condemn even a
monopolist for offering its product at an attractive price, and we therefore have no
warrant to condemn Microsoft for offering either IE or the IEAK free of charge or
even at a negative price. Likewise, as we said above, a monopolist does not violate
the Sherman Act simply by developing an attractive product.
Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d 34, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
174 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 299-309,
365-81 (1995); Christian Ahlbom, David S. Evans & Jorge Padilla, The Antitrust Economics of Tying:
A Farewell to Per Se Illegality, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming Summer 2003); Warren S. Grimes,
The Antitrust Tying Law Schism: A Critique of Microsoft Ill and a Response to Hylton and Salinger,
70 ANTITRUST L. 199 (2002); Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive




the exit of a competitor that produces a complementary good to deter
future entry into the firm's primary market. '75
Another possible difference between multi-sided and one-sided
markets is that the potential for profits on the other side provides a
possible incentive for exclusive contracts. One of the main Chicago School
observations about exclusive contracts is that a consumer is always free
not to agree to exclusivity. The conclusion is that exclusivity in contracts
must reflect consumers' judgment that the benefits (lower prices or
efficiencies) outweigh the costs of only dealing with one firm. In multi-
sided markets, it is at least possible that there is an externality; exclusive
contracts on one side might help a platform gain market power on other
sides. The consumers agreeing to the exclusive contracts on one side
might, at least in the short run, gain from or be indifferent to exclusivity,
but they may not take into account the costs to consumers on the other
sides from decreased platform competition.
As with exclusivity in one-sided markets, however, this can only be a
concern if one firm has exclusivity over most or all of the market and if the
exclusivity is persistent and durable. For example, consumers on the non-
exclusive side could respond by moving to a competing platform, thus
exerting pressure on consumers on the exclusive side to end exclusivity.
Moreover, in markets with significant buyer concentration, the buyers
would be reluctant to agree to exclusivity if there is some expectation that
it will lead to dominance by that platform, as that will likely result in
higher prices in the future for all sides. As with one-sided markets, one
needs to consider whether the efficiencies from exclusive contracts-for
example, in helping to create a platform that might not otherwise exist for
the benefit of consumers-offset possible costs from reducing
competition.
Economists and antitrust scholars recognize that exclusive dealing
and tying may be innocuous or even pro-competitive in some
circumstances. 76 The courts have, over time, come to agree. 77 The usual
175 See Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying To Preserve and
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).
176 See POSNER, supra note 116, at 171-84; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 39, at 303-06.
177 The Court in Jefferson Parish noted the potential efficiencies from tying arrangements.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 41 (1984). The Court in Tampa Electric also
found that the contract in question did not foreclose competition:
[W]e seem to have only that type of contract which "may well be of economic
advantage to buyers as well as to sellers"... In the case of the buyer it 'may assure
supply,' while on the part of the seller it 'may make possible the substantial
reduction of selling expenses, give protection against price fluctuations, and . . .
offer the possibility of a predictable market.
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-35 (1961); see also Richard Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 2 (1977) ("the Court in Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. repudiated Schwinn and held that
nonprice restrictions on dealer competition are not illegal per se even if imposed in a sales contract.").
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explanations for why firms engage in these practices apply, of course, to
platform markets. Other plausible reasons may depend on the multi-sided
nature of the markets. Consider exclusive dealing. An essential
characteristic of a platform is the fact that to be viable it must be able to
deliver customer group A to customer group B (and often vice versa). And
there may be marquee customers whose allegiance makes it easier to get
all sides on board during platform entry. Therefore, platforms may find
that they can provide a more valuable product to customer group A if they
can guarantee the delivery of some portion of customer group B-either a
critical mass or the marquee players. Exclusive dealing contracts would
appear to be efficient especially when it is expensive to multihome and
when there are significant switching costs between competing platforms
on, let us say, side B. In that case, customers on side B realize benefits
when they can base their choice of platform providers on the number and
types of A customers they get from this platform. Empirically, however,
exclusive contracts that foreclose market competition do not appear
prevalent in multi-sided markets; as we saw earlier, most multi-sided
markets have multihoming on at least one side.
Tying is a fundamental business strategy in a wide variety of markets,
and platform businesses are no exception.17 8 Most platforms design their
products or enforce rules that combine things that could, in principle, be
sold separately. Media platforms require subscribers to "buy" advertising
as well as content. Exchanges require sellers to "buy" specific auction
services as well as access to potential buyers. Software platforms require
users to "buy" APIs 179 that they may not want and that take up space on
their hard drives. Payment card platforms require merchants to "buy" all of
the card transactions generated by cardholders who want to use their cards
at the merchant.°80 These ties obviously foreclose customers on one side or
the other from certain choices that may prove beneficial to them. However,
they enable the platform to internalize externalities and, therefore, provide
a more valuable group of interrelated products and services to the diverse
customer communities they serve. Most platforms evolve gradually,' 8' and
See generally Ahlbom, Evans & Padilla, supra note 174, at 23 ("U.S. antitrust policy towards tying
had a long journey from the hostile approach of the early per se rule to a modified per se rule willing
to consider the possibility of tying efficiencies (with four judges in favor of a rule of reason) under
Jefferson Parish, to a neutral position under the Microsoft III rule of reason.").
178 See Ahlbom, Evans & Padilla, supra note 174.
179 Application Programming Interfaces ("APIs") refer to modules of code contained in the
operating system that applications developers can access through interfaces exposed by the operating
system. The applications developers' software can provide parameters through the interface, which
then result in the module performing some task and delivering its result through the interface.
180 For instance, merchants cannot "untie" American Express corporate cards from
consumer-oriented American Express "Blue" cards. See Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of
Law in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment at 10-11, In re
Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig, (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. CV-96-5238).
181 See Evans & lansiti, supra note 15.
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will often experiment with ties and integration in their attempts to get all
sides on board and internalize externalities.'82
Two kinds of public policies can discourage the integration of
production into efficient multi-sided platforms. Antitrust policies against
tying are one, and regulatory policies that impose "line-of-business"
restrictions on platforms are another. Both policies are sometimes justified
on the grounds that they are necessary to discourage "monopoly
leveraging."'8 3 In the case of multi-sided platform markets, public policy
needs to be careful to avoid suppressing the development of platforms that
improve social welfare by internalizing externalities across diverse
customer communities.
"Tying" products on one side may produce benefits to customers on
the other side.8 4 That occurs when customers on side B derive value from
the fact that both they and the customers on side A have the same set of
products or technologies. The platform may generate more value overall in
this case. Given the complexities of determining pricing levels, it is not
possible to predict a priori how tying will affect the price levels and the
relative prices for two or more sides. However, it is possible that the
combined price paid by side A for the tied products could be significantly
lower than the prices that would emerge if the products were not tied,
because the pricing structure may pass much of the overall value of the tie
to side A rather than B.
C. Countervailing Efficiencies
Efficiencies play an important role in evaluating antitrust matters. In
the merger context, the social benefits of economies of scale and scope
weigh against the social costs of price increases through reduced
competition; these economies may be so large that consumers benefit from
lower prices even after accounting for price increases from reduced
competition. In cases involving a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis, the
courts consider whether the efficiencies that result from challenged
practices outweigh their anti-competitive effects. Finally, in cases
involving practices that are usually considered per se illegal, the courts
182 In Microsoft Ill the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals developed a rule of reason approach
for tying in software platform markets. They recognized that, at least in certain circumstances, even the
modified per se approach adopted in Jefferson Perish would be overly restrictive toward tying
arrangements. See Microsoft 111, 253 F.3d 34, 95-96 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
183 See Ahlbom, Evans & Padilla, supra note 174; Patrick Rey et al., The Activities of a
Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for
Competitive Policy 21-23 (Sept. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Yale Journal of
Regulation).
184 1 am using the word "tying" in the colloquial sense to simplify the exposition. There is
little economic content in the various legal discussions of whether two products are "tied" or not.
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consider whether efficiencies are so pronounced that the practices should
be analyzed under the rule of reason.
Two special issues involving efficiencies arise when considering
multi-sided platform markets. The first concerns the benefits that
consumers receive from practices that are either essential for getting all
sides on board or that get all sides on board at lower costs than alternative
practices. I have already touched on some of these above in the discussion
of pricing and tying strategies, for example. In this part, I discuss the
efficiency consequences of cooperation among competitors in platform
markets. The second concern relates to the benefits that consumers on each
side obtain as a result of having access to consumers on the other side.
1. Cooperation Among Competitors
Cooperation among competitors is a common feature of multi-sided
platform markets. We saw earlier that platforms improve efficiency by
acting as intermediaries between multiple customer groups and
internalizing the indirect externalities generated by these groups. The
intermediary need not be a unitary for-profit firm. It may be an
institution-a joint venture, a cooperative, or a standard-setting body-that
facilitates intermediation. For example, payment card associations operate
the network and set rules that result in the determination of a pricing
structure. Real estate agencies have associations that operate the Multiple
Listing Services ("MLS").'85  Multihoming also gives competitors
incentives to coordinate. 8 6 American Express and Visa, for example, are
both members of Global Platform, an international organization that sets
standards for smart card technology, 187 and are using Global Platform
standards in their respective efforts to develop smart cards. 8
Multi-sided firms sometimes take actions to coordinate the behavior
of their customers; standardization by one set of customers benefits the
other set of customers. For instance, B2Bs have been moving towards the
standardization of information that might significantly enhance and
185 Real estate boards are non-profit organizations, which represent local real estate agents
and brokers and operate Multiple Listing Services in local communities. For a definition, see Homes
and Real Estate: Advice and Information for Home Buyers and Homeowners [sic], Real Estate
Glossary, at http://www.homes-and-real-estate.com/glossary/r.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
186 One or both sides of the market can benefit when there is a standard technology or
protocol that enables them to use products from multiple vendors. Two-sided firms have conflicting
profit incentives: They would like to discourage standardization to increase their own market power,
but they would also like to encourage standardization to expand overall demand.
187 See Global Platform, News, at http://www.globalplatform.org/news2.asp (last visited
Mar. 8, 2003).
188 See Global Platform, Global Platform Specification, at http://intemational.visa.con-/fb/
paytech/productsplatforms/globalplatform.jsp (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); GLOBAL PLATFORM,
GLOBAL PLATFORM BROCHURE, at http://www.globalplatform.org/pdf/GlobalPlatformBrochure.pdf
(last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
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internalize the indirect network externalities created by merchants for
cardholders and vice versa. A centrally set interchange fee enables the
cooperatives to establish a pricing structure. A higher interchange fee
tends to raise merchant fees and lower cardholder fees. The interchange
fee that maximizes the profits of the association's members-or their
overall output if that is the objective-is based in a complex way on the
cost and demand on both sides. 95 One cannot easily determine whether the
pricing structure that emerges here-or in other platform markets-is the
socially optimal one. 196 There is, however, no economic basis for
concluding a priori that the pricing structure established by the platform is
biased toward one side or the other. More importantly, the economics
literature shows that cost-based pricing rules are not in general socially or
privately optimal for platforms in multi-sided markets.' 97
Antitrust authorities are rightfully suspicious about collaborations
among competitors. However, legal rules that deter cooperation can result
in the suppression of competition in multi-sided platform markets.'98
Platform markets tend to have significant indirect network effects and
fixed costs of operation. We therefore expect that only a few platforms
will be viable in many multi-sided markets. That is what we see in most of
the examples we have considered. It is possible, however, to secure greater
competition over the determination of pricing levels for the multiple sides
if setting the pricing structure-the intermediation function-can be done
centrally while the determination of the pricing levels can be done
competitively. For example, the MasterCard cooperative model provides a
more competitive business structure for providing payment card services
than the American Express proprietary model. In fact, competition for
cardholders and merchants from the bank cooperatives has forced
American Express's prices down over time.1
99
2. Efficiencies from Internalizing Network Externalities
The raison d'etre of platforms, as we have seen, is to internalize
externalities that consumers on the multiple sides cannot internalize on
their own. The social surplus thereby generated is likely to be substantial
195 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 30-31; Rochet & Tirole, Cooperation,
supra note 14, at 558-59; Schmalensee, supra note 14, at 118-20; JULIAN WRIGHT, THE
DETERMINANTS OF OPTIMAL INTERCHANGE FEES IN PAYMENT SYSTEMS (Univ. of Auckland Dep't. of
Econ., Working Paper No. 220, 2001); Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 12-14.
196 See Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra note 14, at 31; see also Parker & Van Aistyne,
supra note 14, at 14.
197 See generally Schmalensee, supra note 14. See also Rochet & Tirole, Platform, supra
note 14, at 37-38.
198 See generally Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic Princtiples for Guiding Antitrust
Policy Towards Joint Ventures, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 223 (1998).
199 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 188-89.
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automate various procedures such as requests for proposals ("RFPs"),
requests for quotes ("RFQs"), fax requests, phone inquiries, and purchase
orders. 89 Net Market Makers ("NMMs"), third-party intermediaries whose
primary purpose is to match corporate buyers and sellers, play a pivotal
role in this process.
190
Antitrust and regulatory authorities have considered coordination
among competitors in multi-sided platform markets extensively in the
payment card industry in the collective setting of interchange fees (the fees
paid by merchants' banks to cardholders' banks) by associations. U.S.
courts considered interchange fee setting in the late 1970s and concluded
"[a]n abundance of evidence was submitted from which the district court
plausibly and logically could conclude that the [interchange fee] on
balance is procompetitive because it was necessary to achieve stability and
thus ensure the one element vital to the survival of the VISA system-
universality of acceptance." 19' The Reserve Bank of Australia ("RBA")
reached a different conclusion in a recent investigation. 192 It relied on its
economic expert's opinion that Visa's interchange fees "may promote
socially excessive card use."' 93 It decided to impose cost-based regulation;
interchange fees may not exceed the sum of certain direct costs that
payment card issuers incurred on behalf of payment card acquirers.
The economics of multi-sided platform competition provides a
straightforward analysis of the role of interchange fees.' 94 Proprietary
systems such as American Express have two price instruments available to
get both sides on board-cardholder and merchant fees. Charge card
systems-such as Diners Club and, historically, American Express-set
these fees so that merchants contributed the preponderance of fees. The
fees do not track marginal costs on either side of the system. This pricing
structure is similar to that adopted by many other platforms in other multi-
sided markets.
Members of cooperative systems such as MasterCard and Visa
compete for cardholders and merchants. Absent coordination there is no
way for these members to determine pricing structure and thereby
189 Roopen Roy & Abhijit Roy, Net Market Makers: The Winners in the B2B Play!,
INDIAINITIATIVE.COM, Dec. 21, 2001, at http://www.indiainitiative.com/indiainitiativenew/e-
business/b2b abhi-roopen.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
190 Id.
191 Nat'l Bankcard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592,605 (11 th Cir. 1986).
192 See RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA
IV, FINAL REFORMS AND REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT (2002). The author was consultant to Visa
International on this matter and co-authored a submission to the RBA.
193 See MICHAEL L. KATZ, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD
SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA II 20 (2001) (emphasis added), quoted in RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA,
REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 32 (2001).
Professor Katz did not conclude that privately optimal interchange fees in fact promote socially
excessive card use, only that they may do so.
194 See Ahlbom, Evans & Padilla, supra note 174.
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in many contexts, because each consumer on one side is providing a
benefit to all consumers on the other side. This externality will rarely track
the proportionality that Rochet and Tirole found in credit cards. In many
matching circumstances, consumers on one side benefit from having more
search possibilities on the other side, but there are sharply diminishing
returns. 200 Nevertheless even small spillovers can easily add up to
important magnitudes.
A numerical example based on the same equations from Parker and
1 1 .~~20 1 T rvdVan Alstyne that underlie Figure 1 demonstrates this point. To provide a
point of comparison, first set the externalities on each side of the market to
zero. For this base case, we get a symmetric equilibrium with prices on
both sides equal to 0.5 and quantities on both sides equal to 0.5. Thus, the
aggregate price and the aggregate quantity each total 1. This symmetric
equilibrium is analogous to Panel A in Figure 1 above. Compare this
equilibrium to one in which a small positive externality of 0.1 runs from
side 1 to side 2,202 and a larger but still moderate positive externality of 0.5
runs from side 2 to side 1.203 As compared to the first zero-externality case,
for this case the aggregate price remains at 1.0, but aggregate equilibrium
quantity increases from 1.0 to 1.4--a forty percent increase in total
output.20 4 These considerations have been found to be empirically
important for yellow pages. Internalizing the indirect effects significantly
increases consumer welfare for businesses that advertise in and shoppers
who rely on yellow pages.:
°5
The merger of two firms in a multi-sided market is an obvious place
in which competition regulators should consider the efficiencies from the
merger as well as its prospect for increasing prices. ATM network mergers
are a good example. °6 Combining ATM networks could generate
200 See Kenneth Burdett & Kenneth L. Judd, Equilibrium Price Dispersion, 51
ECONOMETRICA 955, 964-67 (1983); Steven Stem, The Effects of Firm Optimizing Behaviour in
Matching Models, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 647, 651-52 (1990).
201 Equilibrium prices are calculated from Equations 5 and 6 in Parker & Van Alstyne, with
Q,.=QV,=Vj=l and the intemetwork externality terms e21 and e12 set as described in the text above.
The resulting equilibrium prices are then substituted into Equations 3 and 4 to obtain equilibrium
quantities. See Parker & Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 10-11.
202 That is, the intemetwork externality effect for side I on side 2, e2, equals 0.1.
203 That is, the intemetwork externality effect for side 2 on side 1, e21, equals 0.5. Recall
that in Figure 1, the intemetwork externality effect for side 2 on side I runs from zero in Panel A to 1.1
in Panel C.
204 The equilibrium is no longer symmetric, either. As a result of the greater externality from
side 2's participation, prices on side 2 are "subsidized" by side 1: The price on side 2 falls from 0.500
to 0.357, while the price on side I increases to 0.643. Both equilibrium quantities increase: Side I
quantity rises from 0.500 to 0.705, and side 2 quantity rises to 0.714.
205 See RYSMAN, supra note 33, at 1-2. This same work, however, finds that the costs of
reduced competition outweigh the benefits from internalizing the network effects.
206 Robin A. Prager, A TM Network Mergers and the Creation of Market Power, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 355 (1999). Some examples of ATM mergers include Peak-Minibank (1996),
Exchange-Instant Teller (1996), and SCS-Pacific Interchange (1992). Id. at 361.
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consumer benefits by increasing the number of machines available to
network customers; by making off-premise ATMs more feasible in
supermarkets, airports, and the like as the customer base increased; and by
lowering customer fees as the network providers realized lower per-
transaction costs due to economies of scale. ATM network mergers could
also increase market power, though, by reducing the number of potential
competitors as adjacent networks merged. With fewer networks to choose
from, consumers would find it more difficult to switch providers. In that
case, consumers could be harmed as prices rose.' °7 An empirical study of
yellow pages finds that the net effect of mergers may be to reduce
consumer welfare: The welfare losses from price increases swamp the
welfare gains from the additional indirect network effects on both market
sides.2" 8
In rule-of-reason cases the courts need to examine the effect of the
challenged practice on consumer demand on each side of the market and
the interrelated indirect effects. Consider the Visa Check/MasterMoney
litigation. 20 9 The merchant plaintiffs claim that Visa's honor-all-cards rule
requiring merchants to accept all Visa cards constitutes an illegal "tie"
between credit card acceptance and debit card acceptance that forecloses
competition by competing debit platforms. (Plaintiffs make the same
allegation regarding MasterCard's honor-all-cards rule.) Visa and
MasterCard claim that their honor-all-cards rules benefit cardholders and
merchants, along the lines discussed. One way to assess these competing
claims is to consider how the prices and output in the payment card
industry would have evolved in the absence of the "tie"-that is, in the
absence of an honor-all-cards rule that applied to debit and credit cards.
Such an analysis would have to take feedback effects between the two
sides into account. For example, the plaintiff merchants claim that
MasterCard and Visa would have charged a lower interchange fee for debit
cards to persuade merchants to take the cards in the absence of the rule.
The merchants argue that the lower prices would not have any feedback
effects on either side of the charge card market.2"0 That is quite difficult to
imagine. A lower interchange fee would reduce the stream of revenues to
banks that issue debit cards; under competition, these banks would
increase the fees they charge for debit cards; that it turn would reduce the
number of debit cards held and used; that in turn would reduce the value
207 Prager found that the wave of ATM network mergers taking place in the 1990s did not
result in higher prices to consumers or slower output growth. He could not distinguish, however,
between a lack of increased market power and an offsetting of market power with efficiency gains. See
Prager, supra note 206, at 363.
208 See RYSMAN, supra note 33.
209 See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001).
210 In re Visa Check/MasterMoney, 192 F.R.D. 68, 74-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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that merchants get from debit cards; that in turn would reduce the value of
debit cards to cardholders; and so forth.2 '
Conclusion
Platform markets arise in many economically significant industries
from media to payment systems to software. Some platform businesses are
small-like the dating club with which we began. Others are enormous-
like the MasterCard and Visa cooperatives that serve millions of merchants
and cardholders around the world. Multi-sided platforms include several
widely recognized brands: American Express, Bloomberg, Century 21,
eBay, Microsoft, Sony, and Visa. Platforms have been part of the
economic landscape for a long time: the village matchmaker from
millennia past, Diners Club in the early 1950s, and Multiple Listing
Services in real estate in the early 1970s. 212 Multi-sided platforms are
likely to become more important parts of the economy as the information-
technology revolution continues. For example, although irrational
exuberance may have given dot-coins a bad name, Internet-based
businesses will likely flourish over time and many of these will be multi-
sided platforms.
Multi-sided platform businesses compete in ways that seem surprising
from the vantage point of traditional industries but seem obvious once one
understands the business problems they must solve. "Getting both sides on
board," "the chicken-and-egg problem"-these are the mantras one hears
from the entrepreneurs in these industries, the trade press that covers them,
business gurus, and journalists. They contain important economic truths.
Multi-sided platforms have to come up with the right price structure and
the right investment strategy for balancing the demands of the customer
groups they must get and keep on their platforms. That is a different
problem than is faced by one-sided firms.
It is also a harder problem for multi-sided firms. Different multi-sided
firms have chosen different price structures and have realized different
fortunes from their choices. American Express bet on a price structure
skewed against merchants. It worked for some years but then got it into
trouble:213 Visa, with a different pricing structure, surpassed the seemingly
211 Based on the arguments presented at class certification, the plaintiffs appear to be arguing
that it is possible to change one element of the pricing structure without having significant effects on
the other elements. They argued that "under the particular circumstances of the market at issue in this
case, credit card interchange fees would not have increased in the 'but-for,' untied world." See Visa
Check/MasterMoney, 280 F.3d at 154-55.
212 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36, at 62-65; Joe Frey, The Dawning of the Age
of IDX, REALTOR.ORG, Nov. 14, 2002, at http://www.realtor.org/realtororg.nsf/pages/
dawnoflDX?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
213 Between the mid-1980s and 1996 the American Express charge and credit card share
dropped from more than twenty-four percent to sixteen percent. By the mid-1990s American Express
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indomitable American Express.1 4 Microsoft bet on a price structure that
catered to software developers. Apple did not. Bloomberg bet on a simple
formula for its data terminals-a flat fee for subscribers and few charges
for content providers. Despite following a similar price structure, Reuters
has not come close to Bloomberg's level of success.
Business platforms provide enormous social value by internalizing
externalities among different customer groups and, in some cases, by
creating products and services that could not exist without this
intermediation. Antitrust, regulatory, and other government policies that
hinder entrepreneurs from creating and maintaining platforms come at
significant cost. Of particular concern are policies that seek to prevent
firms from leveraging their success in one market to other markets-line-
of-business restrictions and prohibitions of tying and other cross-market
practices are primary examples. This problem appears acute in
telecommunications, where a web of regulations and antitrust decisions
limit tying, bundling, and integrating various kinds of services.21 5
I do not mean to suggest that antitrust and regulatory scrutiny of
multi-sided platforms is unwarranted. These businesses, like all
businesses, may engage in strategies, from price fixing to exclusive
contracts, that reduce consumer welfare. However, society needs to
consider the overall effects of regulatory and antitrust intervention on
consumer welfare. Does government intervention increase consumer
welfare in a particular case after taking into account the role of the
platform in harnessing indirect network effects? And can government
scrutiny distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive
practices with sufficient precision that the cost of "false convictions" does
not exceed the cost of "false acquittals?"' 1 6 It is doubtful that the courts
can accurately distinguish "low prices" that are anti-competitive from
those that are pro-competitive in multi-sided platform markets. Indeed, the
fact that low and negative prices are common and sustainable over the long
run in multi-sided platform markets suggests that low and negative prices
should be presumed pro-competitive in these markets. One can make the
same kinds of arguments in single-sided markets; however, they have
greater force for multi-sided platform markets where practices that are
realized the necessity of adopting a new business model. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 36,
at 185-93.
214 By 1996 Visa charge and credit card share was more than forty-five percent compared to
sixteen percent held by American Express. Id. at 174, 187.
215 See Alfred E. Kahn, Thoughts on the Past, Present, and Future of Telecommunications
Regulation, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MARKET POWER AND COST ALLOCATION
ISSUES 259, 263 (John R. Allison & Dennis L. Thomas, eds., 1990); see also David Teece,
Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, and Competition, I MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 47 (1995), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volone/teeceart.html.
216 For a discussion of this error-cost framework, see Hylton & Salinger, supra note 174.
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sometimes suspect help internalize indirect network effects and where
complexity makes it harder for courts to distinguish pro-competitive from
anti-competitive strategies.

